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U.S. TRADE POLICY

Throughout the Cold War era the United States guided the international system. Only the former Soviet Union challenged its military
superiority, and until the 1970s no state challenged its economic
supremacy. However, the large problems of the 1970s - the energy
crisis, the Vietnam War, the beginning of a pattern of negative trade
accounts and budget deficits, the decline of the dollar,' the second en1. In 1973, the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates broke down. The
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ergy crisis, the inflation crisis, and the Iran-hostage crisis - began to
chip away at both the image and substance of its mightiness.2 Although
it is still the international system's most powerful actor, it is no longer
a hegemon, and this reality greatly concerns and frustrates it.3
With the onset of the 1980s and the presidency of Ronald Reagan,
the United States sought to reinvigorate itself. To counter the Soviet
threat, it marshalled a military build-up." To counter its relative economic decline, it borrowed heavily, turned toward protectionism, and
began a bilateral and (increasingly) unilateral approach to trade relations with other states.5

Bretton-Woods agreement, established in 1944 as the basis of international finance,
required its contracting parties to fix their exchange rates around a par value - 35
U.S. dollars equalled one ounce of gold. During the late 1960s and early 70s, however,
U.S. economic policy became inconsistent with the goal of maintaining a fixed exchange rate at the predetermined par value. Consequently, the dollar became significantly overvalued - i.e., the supply of dollars greatly exceeded the private demand for
dollars. By 1973, the signatories to Bretton-Woods were unable to sustain the exchange
market intervention necessary to prop-up the dollar and maintain the par value of their
currencies. Thereafter, exchange rates were allowed to float freely. See Timothy J.
Schmidt, The Rise of U.S. Exports to East Asia and Latin America, 79 ECONOMIC
REVIEW 67, 68 (1994).
2. In general, one can attribute the relative U.S. economic decline as a consequence of imperial over-stretch. Also, the defense-oriented national policies of the Cold
War (like the 1958 National Defense Act) encouraged the most able U.S. researchers,
scientists, and technicians to produce military technology. In Japan, the emphasis on
production mobilized its most able into industries producing for the civilian sector. See
Martin E. Weinstein, The Impact of Trade Problems on U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation, in THOMAS D. MASON & ABDUL M. TURAY, U.S.-JAPAN TRADE FRICTION 88
(1991); see also PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987).

3. This deterioration is partly shown in the dollar's decline vis-A-vis the Japanese
yen (and the German mark) during the last decade. In 1985, the dollar traded for
approximately 250 yen. In the summer of 1995, it traded for less than 100, hitting an
all time low of 79.85 during the week of 16 April 1995.
4. In the long-run, this build-up worsened U.S. competitiveness, for "the spendthrift[sic] policy of the Reagan Administration encouraged, if not caused, a sharp fall
in household savings and an equally sharp rise in federal deficits, 'bankrupting' the
national economy." CHAE-JIN LEE & HIDEO SATO, U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF KOREA
BANKRUPTING OF AMERICA

5. See

at 148 (1993) (quoting

DAVID CALLEO, THE

(1991)).

ROGER BENJAMIN & LOREN YAGER, FAIRNESS: THE SCYLA AND CHARYB-

DIS OF U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

(1993). The U.S.

turn toward protectionism is a result

of its relative decline in the world economy. This phenomenon parallels Britain's turn
toward protectionism in the early twentieth century. Bhagwati has labeled such phe-

nomena the "diminished giant syndrome." JAGDISH BHAGWATI, POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 48 (1991) [hereinafter BHAGWATI 1991A].
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The U.S. shift away from concentrating on the multilateral negotiating process signaled its dissatisfaction with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This dissatisfaction, which persists today, stemmed from the belief that the GATT had failed to result in a
level playing field." It produced, many in the U.S. Congress complained, a system in which U.S. firms faced increasingly stronger foreign competitors domestically, while facing protected competitors
abroad.
The U.S. frustration with the GATT regime found a target in Japan. Japan replaced the United States as the world's largest creditor
nation; meanwhile, the United States rapidly became the world's largest debtor nation. Whereas the United States used to run current-account surplusses vis-A-vis the rest of the world, now it ran high and
persistent current account deficits, and a significant portion of these
deficits were with Japan.7 Overall, the U.S. economy was in relative
decline, while Japan's was ascending.8 Consequently, much of the U.S.
frustration with decline found a scapegoat in Japan's success. This remains the case today, despite agreement among most economists that
U.S. deficits are due overwhelmingly to macroeconomic imbalances and
that there is little trade policy can do to correct them. 9
In recent years the United States has used aggressive unilateral10
ism to pressure Japan"' (and others) on trade issues. The main tool of

6. U.S. dissatisfaction also stemmed from a fundamental fact about the U.S.
economy. Between 1950 and 1962, when U.S. hegemony was at a peak, the United
States depended on trade for only 9% of GDP. During the period 1984-1992, it depended on trade for 20% of GDP. By comparison, most other industrial economies
have had percentages above 40% since the 1960s. BENJAMIN & YAGER, supra note 5,
at 99. These countries are used to such dependence; the United States is not.
7. A majority of the U.S. trade deficit with Japan stems from auto and auto part
imports.
8. U.S. real growth rates declined from a high of 3.8% (with a corresponding
growth rate of 3.3% in output per hour) in the 1950-1962 period to 2.2% (with a
corresponding growth rate of 1.0% in output per hour) in the 1984 -1992 period. BENJAMIN & YAGER, supra note 5, at 99.

9. See PACIFIC DYNAMISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM (C.
Fred Bergsten & Marcus Noland eds., 1993); PAUL KRUGMAN, TRADE WITH JAPAN:
HAS THE DOOR OPENED WIDER? (1991); Makoto Kuroda, Strengthening Japan-U.S.
Cooperation and the Concept of Japan-U.S.Free Trade Arrangements, in
AREAS AND

U.S.

TRADE POLICY

FREE TRADE

121 (Jeffrey J. Schott, ed., 1989). There is little that

can be done in the short-run about these imbalances - such as differences in savings
and investment rates. Furthermore, some economists argue that these imbalances are
bound to occur periodically and will eventually self-rectify.
10. Aggressive unilateralism has been defined as "any bilateral trade negotiation
in which unilateral demands for liberalization are backed by threats of retaliation."
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this approach has been the enhanced version of Section 30112 of the
1974 Trade Act,13 particularly as augmented by Super 301 which came
into effect with the passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988.14
While pursuing aggressive unilateralism with states like Japan,
U.S. trade policy focused on negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs).
In April 1985, the United States established an FTA with Israel to
eliminate all tariffs on bilateral trade within ten years. 15 Following this
success the United States negotiated an FTA with Canada which took
effect in 1989.16 The conclusion of these two agreements signaled a reversal of past U.S. opposition to the agreements and further reflected

THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY

A.

ELLIOT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S.

19 (1994). Bhagwati argues that unilateralism refers to three different issues: one, seeking unilateral trade concessions from others; two, refusing to submit
to the same dispute resolution processes in determining one's trade rights that one uses
against others; and three, defining unfair trade practices through unilateral specification rather than by treaties. BHAGWATI 1991A, supra note 5, at 51-52.
11. The use of pressure tactics (like Section 301) has been dominant in the U.S.Japan relationship, so much so that the Japanese language created a new word for
foreign pressure - gaiatsu. The term also reflects the realities of the Japanese political
system. Japan's democracy is built on a painstakingly slow consensus building approach
to change, and gaiatsu seems to be a necessary catalyst in its public decision-making.
See Yoichi Funabashi, Introduction to JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 1, 8 (Yoichi
TRADE POLICY at

Funabashi ed., 1994).
12. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act focuses on the policies and practices of
other countries. Since its creation the European Union has by far been its most frequent target, and agricultural disputes have dominated these cases.

BAYARD & ELLIOT,

supra note 10, at 26.
13. Some of the changes in U.S. trade policy discussed in this section can be
traced back to the 1974 Trade Act itself.
14. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.) Special 301, which focuses on intellectual property rights, accompanied
Super 301. Id.
15. Although many view this FTA as a result of historic U.S. strategic interests in
Israel, this FTA eliminated the discrimination against U.S. exports caused by preferences awarded to Western European nations under the 1975 European CommunityIsrael FTA, and the United States has not attempted to link this FTA to strategic
foreign policy objectives like the European Union has. See Howard F. Rosen, The
U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement: How Well Is It Working and What Have We
Learned?, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE

POLICY,

supra note 9, at 97-119.

16. In the CUSFTA (negotiations began in May 1986) the parties contracted to
eliminate all tariffs on bilateral trade within ten years. It also created innovations in
dispute resolution and pioneered new approaches to liberalization in services and investment. See Jeffrey J. Schott, More Free Trade Areas?, in
1, supra note 9, at 6.

TRADE POLICY

FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S.
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its dissatisfaction with the GATT regime.1"
The shift of U.S. trade policy toward FTAs accompanied the faltering Uruguay Round of GATT, the 1992 Single European Act and
negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union, and
the expectation of E.U. enlargement. In this context, the United States,
upon invitation by Mexico, decided to pursue a U.S.-Mexico FTA. 18
After extensive debate in its cabinet, Canada opted to join the negotiations, and the three parties pursued the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).19 Undoubtedly, the United
States perceived the NAFTA as a counterweight to the tremendous
market access bargaining power being assembled by the European
20

Union.

The notion of an FTA with all of Latin America accompanied the
idea of a U.S.-Mexico FTA. Shortly after the announcement of FTA
negotiations between the United States and Mexico, President Bush
unveiled the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI). 1 This raised
the prospect of a Western Hemispheric FTA (WHFTA), and it implicitly committed the United States to the negotiation of FTAs with Latin
American countries.
In sum, aggressive unilateralism and FTAs, not multilateralism,
are now the cornerstones of U.S. trade policy.2" Although economic or-

17. There have been two waves of FTA formation. During the first wave (1960s),
the United States was largely antagonistic toward regional bloc formation. The only
exception to this was the case of Western Europe. The United States viewed its regional moves as a positive step in the direction of European peace. However, during the
second wave (1980s through present day) the United States has been the prime actor in
FTA formation.
18. The decision to pursue an FTA was announced by Presidents Bush and Salinas on June 11, 1990. Mexico viewed an FTA as a way to place a "drop-lock" on its
domestic reforms and attract foreign direct investment. It was definitely successful in
doing the latter: Foreign direct investment in Mexico increased 50% between 1990 and
1991. Scott Stollman, A Regional Approach to Free Trade, paper presented at a seminar on international trade law at Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla. (Apr. 18,
1995, on file with author).
19. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 3301-3473 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1995).
20. See FREDERICK M. ABOTT, LAW & POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE
NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 129-37 (1995).
21. The EAI announcement, made 27 June 1990, relieved many Latin American
officials' fear about trade diversion as a result of a Mexican-U.S. FTA. This may have
been President Bush's intention. Id.
22. See Schott, supra note 16. Bhagwati agrees. He states that "[tihe evidence of
a fundamental change in trade policy is the new interest in regional arrangements and
the departure from the accepted way of 'doing business' under the [GATT] by asserting that demands can be made for unilateral trade concessions by others and enforced
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thodoxy has long considered them second-best solutions, FTAs are not
necessarily negative and neither is aggressive unilateralism. 8 However,
these policies are negative if they are intended to institutionalize purely
preferential treatment to the exclusion of third parties rather than to
further global trade liberalization and global welfare maximization.
Unfortunately, the purpose of U.S. trade policy appears to be the negative aspects of aggressive unilateralism and FTAs. The growing influence of the protectionist lobby in the United States and the Clinton
Administration's emphasis on managed trade lend credence to this perception. 2"' In a world where the salience of military power is declining
and global power is measured more and more in economic terms, the
United States seeks to halt its decline legislatively. To increase the
competitiveness of U.S. industries, U.S. trade policy demands that Japan agree to fulfill sectoral market access targets while simultaneously
seeking to blunt inexorable competition from East Asia 2 5 by gaining
preferential access to Latin American markets through a WHFTA.
This study posits that pursuing a WHFTA and aggressive unilateralism with Japan are not the best trade policies for the United
States (or the world trading system). The United States is wise to en-

by threats of retaliation." BHAGWATI 1991A, supra note 5, at 35. However, to be sure,
favor for the multilateral approach is still strong. The U.S. expenditure of effort on
completing the Uruguay Round of GATT demonstrates that it remains a pillar of U.S.
trade policy, albeit one accompanied by aggressive unilateralism and FTAs.
23. This study criticizes the U.S. purpose in using aggressive unilateralism. The
views of critics like Bhagwati deserve mention. Bhagwati argues that "[e]ven if one
makes the implausible assumption that Section 301 will be used only for 'altruistic'
reasons ... , the notion that the United States should serve as a benign dictator, laying
down its own definition of a desirable trading regime instead of making. . progress by
persuasion and mutual concession, is hard to accept." JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE
WORLD TRADING

SYSTEM AT RISK

at 56 (1991)

[hereinafter

BHAGWATI

1991B].

Bhagwati makes a strong case. Although the argument that aggressive unilateralism
can be used positively is valid in theory, in reality the United States has not often used
aggressive unilateralism in such a manner. The reasons are clear. Opening markets for
all countries is unlikely to satisfy those domestic groups which demand action in the
first place; their objective is not to open markets in general, but to secure market access
for themselves, and they judge market access by their degree of success in those markets. Id. at 52-56. Thus, the U.S. argument that its pressure only aims to get "a foot in
the door" through which all states can access Japan's markets is not persuasive.
24. See BENJAMIN & YAGER, supra note 5, at 38; PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE:
THE

GATT

AND

U.S.

TRADE POLICY

(1993); B. Mulroney, Trade Outlook: Globaliza-

tion or Regionalization (15 Oct. 1989) (published lecture on file with The Institute for
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore).
25. For the purposes of this article, East Asia includes Japan, China, North and
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Brunei.
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courage Latin American regional cooperation and improvement, but
Latin America as a whole does not fit the criteria of an ideal free trade
partner and few Latin American countries have liberalized sufficiently
to expect that a WHFTA will be long-lasting. The potential benefit to
the Unites States of a WHFTA, therefore, is questionable. Since forming a WHFTA encourages the digression of the world trade order into
one of competing blocs, it is unwise for the United States to focus its
policy in this direction.
The United States should focus its efforts to build an institutionalized and cooperative relationship with Japan, its most important trade
partner and a state vital to U.S. efforts to maintain a stable security
environment in East Asia. Japan fits the criteria of an ideal free trade
partner very well. Rather than engaging in quarrelsome debates over
market access targets and threatening to impose Section 301 sanctions,
a threat which, by its mere assertion, further deteriorates U.S.-Japan
relations and revives images of the ugly American, the United States
ought to pursue building a cooperative framework with Japan through
an FTA. Such an agreement would fundamentally alter U.S.-Japan relations by institutionalizing the means for the two countries to cooperate and lead the world in economic policy matters. It would fill the
trust gap and, by doing so, make easier the task of establishing a more
vibrant security alliance. Also, whereas U.S. influence over Japan is
currently declining, a Japan-United States FTA (JUSFTA) would enshrine its influence, providing the United States a far greater amount
of leverage with Japan in the future than it would otherwise possess.
The sections below add to the rationale and substance of the arguments above. Section one begins by introducing the reader to the economics of FTAs and the reasons behind their implementation; it also
discusses the prospects for the current regionalism to be open and the
issue of trade diversion. From there section two develops a two-tier free
trade partner model, with the first tier focused on trade indicators and
the second tier on readiness factors - including states' level of
democracy.
Section three quantitatively and qualitatively demonstrates that
Japan, but not Latin America, fits the ideal free trade partner model.
This finding indicates that hemispheric free trade would not be the
panacean windfall U.S. trade policy makers may desire it to be. It also
strongly suggests that the dynamic trade creation benefits of pursuing
true liberalization in the U.S.-Japan trade relationship would be quite
large given the two economies' existing levels of interdependence, competitiveness, and wealth. For this reason the study argues that, rather
than expend its limited resources on a small-gain game such as a
WHFTA, the United States should focus its cooperative efforts fore-
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most toward Japan. In support of this position the study holds that nontraditional access barriers are both the explanation as to why the
United States and Japan do not already have an FTA and the reason
their relationship needs one.
Section 4 then critiques some of the problems with the current
U.S. trade policy toward Japan and explains why, rather than pursuing
managed trade deals and threatening Section 301 sanctions, the negotiation of a Japan-United States Free Trade Agreement (JUSFTA)
would be a better approach to mitigating U.S.-Japan trade tensions.
An in-depth discussion of the 1995 U.S.-Japan auto and auto parts dispute helps illustrate the correctness of this argument.
Finally, section five proposes the JUSFTA framework. It discusses
possible Japanese and U.S. motivation in JUSFTA negotiations, pinpoints likely JUSFTA objectives, and recommends the key JUSFTA
components needed to achieve those objections: One, a consultative
mechanism with two necessary sub-components - Structural Impediment Talks aimed at encouraging the amelioration of external imbalances and Working Groups aimed at harmonization of regulatory and
industry standards; two, a dispute resolution mechanism that is selfexecuting (thus allowing private parties, not just the two governments,
to bring suit), speedy (capable of rendering decisions within one year),
and pro-active (authorized to appoint new working groups to iron out
problems which the originally-negotiated JUSFTA rules do not address); and three, a G2 for increased macroeconomic policy
coordination.
The article concludes that, even though its pursuit would be immense in terms of time, effort, and difficulty, the JUSFTA would necessitate cooperation, better resolve trade disputes, and encourage true
long-term liberalization and trust in the U.S.-Japan relationship. In addition to de-politicizing trade disputes which are bound to occur between such competitive trade partners, it would bring much welcomed
relief to the security side of the alliance. It would begin realizing the
once much talked about "global partnership" between the two countries, and, having established the means of cooperation in its most vital
trade relationship, it would provide the platform from which the United
States could launch a new round of multilateral GATT trade negotiations aimed at harmonization of standards and competition policies, as
well as furthering progress on trade in services and intellectual property rights. Overall, a JUSFTA would be a giant leap toward establishing free trade throughout the world, and it would burnish the tarnished
image of U.S. leadership in international economic affairs.
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Section 1: Free Trade Agreements, Regionalism, and Trade
Creation/Trade Diversion
Scholars currently debate the idea of free trade agreements with
vigor. Among economists a key issue is that most FTAs appear to be
regionally focused, implying that they are closed to non-regional states.
This selective approach to trade liberalization is commonly referred to
as regionalism. To be sure, the strength of any trend toward regionalism and its possible effects on the world trading system are major questions still largely unanswered, but there has been great concern that
trade is unnecessarily becoming regionalized at the expense of global
welfare. In other words, there is concern that trade is being diverted
from efficient producers to less efficient producers due to the preferential treatment which FTA members grant each other. Some of the factors that lead to these concerns over trade diversion and regionalism
are discussed below. First, however, this section clarifies more precisely
the substance of FTAs.
1.1

FTAs

FTAs are a way to help manage and establish bilateral, minilateral, or multilateral trade relations. They can be an effective and
expeditious means of achieving trade liberalization between trading
partners. Primarily they eliminate border barriers to trade between
countries - e.g., quotas and tariffs. They are not customs unions, however, for each member maintains its own tariff policies when trading
with non-members.
FTA members receive preferential treatment. 6 To ensure protection of these preferences, FTAs erect rules of origin which prevent
third parties from shipping through a lower-tariff member to a highertariff member. Thus, GATT's fundamental principal of most favored
nation (MFN) treatment does not apply to the concessions FTA members grant each other.2 7 FTAs are nevertheless GATT compatible if
they meet the requirements of Article XXIV, namely, the liberalization
of substantially allbarriers affecting trade in goods between member
countries.2 8
FTAs can be open to third party accession. However, since new
members "dilute the value of preferences received by existing FTA
26. When market access comes at the expense of non-members it is called trade
diversion (see section 1.3).
27. Article XXIV of the GATT gives FTAs exemption from the MFN treatment
requirement.
28. Schott, supra note 16, at 15.

1996]

IDEAL FREE TRADE PARTNERS

members, there are few examples of open-ended FTAs. ' ' 29 Indeed, any
FTA involving the United States is difficult to open, for the 1988 Trade
Act prohibits the accession of any third party to a U.S. FTA without

new congressional approval. 80
1.1.1

Non-Traditional FTAs

FTAs can be a wide variety of arrangements geared toward improving trade relations. They do not necessarily have to involve the liberalization of substantially all barriers to trade. The agenda in negotiating an FTA can be targeted to specific issues in a trade relationship;
in other words, an FTA can be tailor-made. As such, some non-traditional FTAs might have only selective liberalization and therefore
might lie outside of GATT.3 1 Such selective liberalization agreements
might be product- or sector-specific; however, they can be used as
building blocks to larger agreements.
Even though some non-traditional FTAs might lie outside of
GATT, they might be conducive to a global free trade system. FTAs
are as much about rules, procedures and governance as they are about
trade barriers, and non-traditional FTAs can emphasize these aspects.32
For instance, they can establish special administrative bodies capable
of facilitating the parties' relationship, or they may establish significant

29. Id. This suggests a problem for the pursuit of a WHFTA. It is in the Latin
American countries' collective interest to pursue NAFTA accession simultaneously, for
then their collective size would force the NAFTA members to concede more preferences than they would if countries negotiated on an individual basis. Acquiring such
bargaining strength, however, requires that the Latin American countries integrate
among themselves first - or at the least come to an agreement over what concessions
they want from the NAFTA members. They could best do this through integrating
their existing regional agreements. They show few signs of doing this, however, and the
NAFTA members are moving in the direction of single country accession. Since
NAFTA has already invited Chile to join, it appears that the Latin American countries
will have to accede individually or through their existing regional blocks. If this turns
out to be the case, one can imagine that as more and more countries accede to
NAFTA, more and more of the Latin American NAFTA members will become opposed to new applicants. Again, they do not want to further dilute the preferences they
have received - i.e., preferential access to the NAFTA market - and they do not
wish to dilute any of the new foreign direct investment which NAFTA membership has
brought them.
30. Id.
31. Such FTAs, to comply with GATT, would need to obtain a waiver under Article XXV:5. The United States did this for the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact. Id. at 14.
32. Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Regionalism and Layered Gov-

ernance: The Choice of Trade Institutions, 48
95, 114 (1994).

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

72 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE

[Vol. 20

consultative and dispute resolution mechanisms between the parties.8"
1.2

Regionalism

Most FTAs formed today are regionally focused. Although the
Israel-U.S. FTA is a notable exception, the fact of regional FTAs has
caused observers to fear that the world trading system is degenerating
into three regional trading blocks anchored by the United States, Germany, and Japan. This fear stems from the possibility of regional FTAs
intensifying and proliferating - the so-called domino effect.
The fear of a domino effect in regionalism may be somewhat overstated. East Asia, including Japan, is committed to multilateralism. Its
unprecedented growth in the post-World War II system has been
trade-based. It wishes to consolidate GATT, not usurp it, for it has
34
been the greatest beneficiary of the GATT system.
On the other hand, the fear of a domino effect in regionalism may
be justifiable. "A danger with regionalism is that, depending on its formulation and implementation, it can serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy:
[A] . . . bloc which is conceived as a defense [or insurance] against
the fragmentation of the world economy is likely to contribute to such
fragmentation."3 5 Thus, there is a danger in the U.S. proposal to form
a WHFTA.
The possibility of a WHFTA has worried the rest of the world,
especially East Asia, the world's fastest growing region. Although East
Asia must realize that NAFTA's current form is not seriously threatening (since Mexico and Canada traded heavily with the United States
prior to NAFTA), Malaysia was sufficiently concerned with the enlargement of NAFTA on a solely geographical basis to propse an East
Asian Economic Group (EAEG). The EAEG idea - rejected initially
but still alive 6 - shows a real danger in a WHFTA. It encourages a
33. Id. at 11. A consultative framework agreement involves creating guidelines
and rules which establish the proper environment in which to conduct negotiations and
consultations. A dispute resolution agreement regulates how partners should solve disputes and may entail binational panels which issue binding judgments on cases brought
before them. id. at 14.
34. See Soogil Young, East Asia as a Regional Force for Globalism, in RE-

126 (Kym Anderson &
Blackhurst eds., 1993).
Id. at 127.
At least one expert believes that "in nongovernmental circles, including in Jaidea remains alive, and there appears to be a growing number of proponents."

GIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM

Richard
35.
36.
pan, the

Hadi Soesastro, Implications of the Post-Cold War Politico-Security Environment for
the Pacific Economy, in PACIFIC DYNAMISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

365, supra note 9, at 379.
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narrow, geographically defined Asian regionalisms' which is wholly
against U.S. interests considering the fact that East Asia is the fastest
growing and largest U.S. regional trade partner.3 8 Although East Asia
might not desire a regional bloc, the question of how best to function in
a world trade system increasingly driven by two large and expanding
blocs - i.e., the European Union plus the NAFTA (or a WHFTA) might necessitate a regional answer.
Domino effect or not, regionalism is not necessarily bad for the
world economy. A regional approach to trade might allow a greater
degree of harmonization of standards among states than is readily
achieved through the multilateral process. The reason is clear: There
are fewer parties to the negotiating process. Membership in GATT has
grown from the original 23 states to 120 today. Indeed, the intensive
and difficult task of negotiating the Uruguay Round of GATT compares negatively to the more easily achieved NAFTA. This experience
causes some game-theorists to speculate that "if one envisions a twostep process, then the bloc approach might well be the best strategy for
liberalizing global trade." 9 In other words, if regionalism proceeded
upon current paths, then three blocs would emerge, and then these
three blocs, as compared to 120 countries, could negotiate to reach
global free trade. This might be a quicker process than multilateralism.
A second scenario is also possible. An important fact to remember
is that the Uruguay Round of GATT reduced tariff barriers from approximately 6.3 % to 3.9% .40 Hence the agenda in future trade negotiations will include less discussion about tariffs and more about nontariff barriers (like the particularly difficult issue of harmonization of
national standards). Although these issues might be more readily

37. Despite the inherent leadership problems for East Asia in forming such a collective bloc without the United States, it is best for U.S. actions to discourage rather
than encourage such ideas.
38. East Asia is the United States' most vibrant and promising trading partner,
and East Asian wealth is growing far faster than Latin America's or any of the industrialized nations. Throughout the rest of the 1990s East Asia is expected to grow 7.6%
annually - a rate 2.5 times the expected growth rates of the OECD states and well
beyond what anyone predicts for Latin America. Schmidt, supra note 1, at 74; see also
GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, WESTERN HEMISPHERIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1994). The late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown remarked that "these
[East Asian] nations are the fastest growing markets for U.S. goods, and if we are to
expand the share of world markets claimed by [U.S.] companies and workers, it will
occur in these countries." Quoted in Schmidt, supra, note 1, at 74.
39. Heemin S. Kim & Dale L. Smith, Blocs or Rounds? A Formal Analysis of
Two Competing Approaches to Trade Liberalization at i (1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
40. Id.

74

MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE

[Vol. 20

solved through regionalism due to cultural familiarities among the actors within a region, there is the distinct possibility that the new blocs
will develop unbridgeable trade philosophies and laws. Thus, while the
world's standards are currently converging due to the multilateral process, a regional focus might cause them to diverge and create three
equally powerful and perhaps uncompromising blocs.4 1 Also, if three
blocs were to emerge, it is more likely that instead of negotiating to
achieve global free trade, they would accept free but managed trade
between the blocs.

A key question concerning regionalism, then, is whether or not it is
open. Open regionalism means that the FTA is open to any state, anywhere, which is willing to live by the FTA's rules. 2 Closed regionalism
means that the FTA is only open to those states which lie in the defined
region. An important determinate of the type of regionalism may be
the motivation behind the FTA formation - e.g., whether the reasons

behind it are more defensive, offensive, or integrationist in composition;
whether it is formed to allow industries to function as international cartels; or whether it is formed to allow countries with similar trade preferences to exert monopsony power over the rest of the world.
Two arguments - labeled here as the "coercion" and "insurance"
hypotheses - about the motivation behind today's regionalism imply
that it is closed.' 8 The thesis of the "coercion" hypothesis is that the

41. There may be yet another danger in regionalism:
The worse the behavior of the [European Union] and the [United States] in
the context of the multilateral system, the more probable will appear the collapse of that system, and the more valuable will be the association [of small
countries] with the [European Union] or the [United States]. Either [the European Union or the United States], therefore, by threatening the multilateral
system, may generate signals that it can interpret as applause for itself and its
policies. It is far from evident that [such a] position is stable.
Brian Hindley & Patrick A. Messerlin, Guarantees of Market Access and Regionalism, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 358, supra note

34, at 382 (1993). In other words, regionalism may be a vicious cycle spiraling the
international system into one of three antagonistic powers with smaller countries forced
to line up behind one of the three. Such a system may be unstable; most system theorists agree that the most unstable international system is one led by three powerful and
competing actors.
42. In other words, states like the United States and Japan could be a part of both
an East Asian-dominated FTA and a Latin American-dominated FTA. So could Chile,
or the Czech Republic, South Africa, and India.
43. A third argument about why countries are currently pursuing FTAs can be
labeled as the drop-lock hypothesis. It argues that countries wish to secure their domestic policy reforms by committing to those reforms in international agreements like
FTAs. This was partly the case for Mexico, but it is far from clear that this is the case
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large countries wish to use regional FTAs to enhance their bargaining
power in bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations and force reluctant
trade partners to make extra concessions. The thesis of the "insurance"
hypothesis is that small countries desire insurance against future large
country protectionism;" they want to maintain their market access.4 5
Small countries also desire insurance to safeguard against the possibility of a global trade war." Meanwhile, large countries desire insurance
against competition. They want to secure dominance in the small country market by gaining market access beyond what GATT provides and
what other large countries are afforded. If the coercion and insurance
hypotheses are correct, then today's regionalism is not geared toward
openness.
Both the coercion and insurance hypotheses describe at least part
of the motivation of the United States and of Latin America in pursuing a WHFTA. First, the United States, seeking to blunt fierce manufacturing competition from East Asia (particularly Hong Kong, South
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Japan), desires to ensure preferential
access to Latin American markets through a WHFTA. A WHFTA
will allow U.S. manufacturers to take better advantage of Latin American factor endowments - land and unskilled labor - than its Asian
competitors. Also, a WHFTA will provide the U.S. an edge in selling
to Latin America goods from industries in which East Asia and the
United States compete head on - electronics, mechanical machinery,
high-technology goods, and financial services. Whereas Latin American
countries currently are heavily involved with Japan as well as the
United States, after a WHFTA they will tend to deal more exclusively
with the U.S. Second, a WHFTA will create a bloc countering the

for countries like Chile, where already implemented reforms have the support of the
citizenry. See, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra
note 34.
44. A large country for a particular good is any country that can affect the world
price for that good through a change in production or trade barriers. The United States
is almost always a large country, but countries like South Korea and Singapore are also
large countries for certain goods.
45. About small countries seeking insurance with the United States, Schott writes:
"This is clearly a response to the perceived growth in 'process protectionism' in the
United States, abetted by their strong trade dependence . . . The interest of candidate
countries lie in attaining an exemption from, or discriminatory preferences pursuant to,
the application of U.S. trade laws." Schott, supra note 16, at 29.
46. See CARLO PERRONI & JOHN WHALLEY, THE NEW REGIONALISM: TRADE
LIBERALIZATION OR INSURANCE?

Paper Series No. 4626, 1994).

(National Bureau of Economic Research Working
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E.U. in new rounds of multilateral negotiations. 47 In circumstances
where the Americas and the E.U. are in agreement, they will effectively force others - i.e., East Asia - to acquiesce to their wishes.
For Latin America, a WHFTA provides insurance against new
U.S. calls for protectionism against developing economies. More importantly for Latin America, however, a WHFTA will bring newfound economic wealth. The first source of this new wealth will be foreign direct
investment (FDI).4 8 A WHFTA will legitimize Latin America's economic policy reforms and foster a perception of stability, both of which
are necessary to increase its access to FDI. Just as important, a
WHFTA will provide Latin America permanent and preferential access to the NAFTA markets, the most important of which is the U.S.
market. This will encourage multinationals with needs like low-wage
labor and less regulation - especially safety and environmental regulations - either to relocate to Latin America or to create new factories
there so that they may enjoy these advantages coupled with cheaper
access to the U.S. market.
In the area of trade, Latin American industries from which the
United States already buys - in other words, industries in which Latin
America has a comparative advantage, e.g., coffee, fruit, iron ore, and
petroleum - will continue such exports, but after the formation of a
WHFTA, because of the preferential treatment Latin America gives
NAFTA members, the United States might begin to buy more from
industries it would otherwise not - in other words, industries in which
Latin America does not have a comparative advantage. Also, in industries - like the textile and apparel industry - where Latin America is
competitive with others - e.g., East Asia - the United States would
likely begin to buy more from Latin America. Like the increase in
FDI, this new trade would be a boon to Latin America, but would
come at the expense of other economies. This overall effect is called
trade diversion.
1.3

Trade Creation/Trade Diversion

FTAs represent "both a policy of protection (against non-mem-

47. However, the fact that NAFTA does not have a common external tariff (and
therefore a WHFTA may also lack the coordinated central institutions for speaking
with one voice in trade) weakens NAFTA as a coercive tool.
48. FDI provides the capital through which a country can expand its manufacturing base and import technology and human capital. This has been critical in the development of East Asian states like Singapore and Malaysia.
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bers) and a move toward free trade (with members)." 4 9 As such, when
an FTA is formed there are two conflicting effects. Jacob Viner labeled
these contradictory pressures as trade diversion and trade creation in
his 1950 classic, The Customs Union Issue. Trade diversion occurs
when an FTA, because of the preferential treatment given to members,
causes low-cost imports from a non-member to be replaced by highercost imports from a member.
Thus, "a trade-diverting FTA expands trade between partners at
the expense of trade between the union and the rest of the world." 50 By
contrast, "a trade-creating FTA does not reduce trade between the
union and the rest of the world, and it expands trade between partners." 51 This distinction allows an analysis of the efficacy of an FTA
for the maximization of the global economic welfare. A trade-diverting FTA worsens the world's allocation of resources by shifting production away from comparative advantage. It also reduces the welfare of
non-members because their resources are used less efficiently than
before trade was diverted. Likewise, a trade-creating FTA improves the
world's allocation of resources.
However, this is a simplification of the effects of an FTA. This
framework focuses only on the static effects of an FTA, and it is widely
held that the dynamic effects are potentially much greater for trade
creation." Dynamic effects may lead to improved efficiency even if the
static effects are predominantly trade diverting. One such dynamic ef-

49.

BETH YARBROUGH

&

ROBERT M.

427 (1994).
50. JAIME DE MELO & ARVIND
POLICY 3 (World Bank, 1992).
51. Id.

YARBROUGH,

THE WORLD

ECONOMY:

TRADE AND FINANCE

PANAGARIYA, THE

NEW

REGIONALISM IN TRADE

52. Srinivasan and his co-authors, however, suggest that trade creation and trade
diversion are "inappropriate for measuring the welfare effects of [an FTA]". They
point out that the drop in prices of goods for the importing country may offset any
losses in tariff revenue. This implies that from the point of view of individual countries,
"the induced changes in the pattern of trade are not reliable predictors of the welfare
consequences of [an FTA]." T. N. Srinivasan et al., Measuring the Effects of Region-

alism on Trade and Welfare, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING
SYSTEM, supra note 34, at 55. Even if this were the case, the concern over trade creation and trade diversion is a global one. It is a concern over what happens to world
welfare, not just domestic welfare. And this concern over world welfare is a legal concern, pursuant to Article XXIV of the GATT.
53. According to Yarbrough & Yarbrough, the analysis of static effects "focuses
on a single time period and on the reallocation of resources caused by elimination of
barriers to intra-group trade." See YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 49, at 429.
The analysis of dynamic effects focuses on how this removal of trade barriers causes
member economies to evolve over time.

78

MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE

[Vol. 20

fect is the creation of economies of scale. Economies of scale are a key
reason for establishing FTAs, and the larger the trade partners are, the
larger the possibility that economies of scale will result. (Some other
dynamic effects include increased competition and stimulus to
5
investment.) "
This discussion begs a few questions: Why does trade creation and
trade diversion matter for a potential FTA member? Should a country
like the United States even be concerned about whether or not an FTA
it pursues creates more trade than it diverts? After all, as long as it
creates more trade for the United States, is it not necessarily in the
U.S.'s interests?
First, all GATT members contemplating an FTA should be concerned about trade diversion - in other words, the possible welfare
effect on the rest of the world. One, their commitment to the fundamental GATT principal that all GATT members are granted MFN
should give them pause in pursuing an FTA, which by its creation
grants members preferential treatment. Two, they should have concern
because a trade-diverting FTA may taint the trade atmosphere for further multilateral cooperation and perhaps undermine the GATT. Nonmembers, fearing the negative consequences of the FTA, might seek to
join or create a competing FTA, making the expansion and proliferation of FTAs more likely.
Even if a country cares not what effect its participation in an FTA
will have on the world trading system, it should nonetheless care about
potential trade diversion. Not all FTAs are in a country's interests. 55
Why?
It is possible that by forming an FTA a country will lose more
welfare than it will gain. Such a welfare loss might ensue if the country
integrated with inefficient producers - i.e., high-cost producers. If integration resulted in trade diversion (i.e., imports from low-cost producers being replaced, due to the preferential treatment FTA members
grant one other, by imports from higher-cost producers), then it is pos-

54. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1968). In regards to the dynamic effects, there is a general bias that an FTA will be trade creating,
for, as Meade noted, "it represents a reduction in trade barriers which will lead in all
cases to some primary expansion of trade, and on this expansion of trade there will
almost always be some important gain." JAMES E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS
UNION 107 (1955). This general bias cannot be adopted for the static effects of an
FTA, however, and in general, one may start with a predisposition that an FTA will
almost always result in some static trade diversion. See Michael G. Plummer & Pearl
I. Iboshi, Economic Implications of NAFTA for ASEAN Members, 11 ASEAN EcoNOMIC BULLETIN 158-75 (1994).
55. See generally Schott, supra note 16.
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sible that the country's loss in tariff revenue could outweigh its gains
through free trade. Although some of its tariff revenue would be transferred to consumers in the form of lower prices, some of it would become a deadweight loss, for it will no longer collect any tariff revenue
from the low-cost producer. This ambiguity can be avoided by integrating with the low-cost producer. In such a case, all ui the previous tariff
revenue would be transferred to consumers in the form of lower prices;
there would be no deadweight loss. Thus, the net effect would be absolute trade creation.
Section 2: An Ideal Free Trade Partner Model
The last section observed that the most important issue in regionalism and FTA formation is whether overall world trade will become
more or less liberal as a consequence. It noted that this involves determining the extent of trade creation and trade diversion caused by the
FTA and that the extent of trade creation and trade diversion is important not only for the world's welfare and the continuance of an open
world trade system, but also for the welfare of the integrating country.
It explained that one of the best ways to minimize trade diversion and
to maximize trade creation is for the country to integrate with low-cost
producers. These low-cost producers are its most ideal free trade
partners.
However, there is more to an ideal free trade partner than being a
low-cost producer. Suppose that a country creates an FTA in the sector
of fresh fish with the low-cost producer of fresh fish, but that fresh fish
constitutes an insignificant portion of the country's overall imports;
then the FTA in fresh fish would be essentially meaningless to the integrating countries. What other factors, then, are important? In other
words, what factors, if present in a potential free trade partner, will
lead to the least trade diversion and the most trade creation?
The analysis below outlines an ideal free trade partner model
which helps answer these questions. The primary tier of this model outlines those ideal trade characteristics of a potential partner which favor
trade creation over trade diversion. However, it should be noted that
this is a static model which can generally indicate if an FTA will lead
to static trade creation but can only imply what the dynamic effects of
an FTA might be. The second tier of this model focuses on how ready a
potential partner is to enter an FTA. It examines macroeconomic, social, and political factors which favor the success of an FTA in the long
run. These factors, however, do not indicate what the trade effects of
an FTA might be; they indicate readiness. This ideal free trade partner
model, then, should be used in the following manner: First, the primary
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tier should be used to examine potential partners' trade characteristics;
second, if and only if a country fits the trade criteria for an ideal free
trade partner, then the second tier should be used to indicate the potential partner's readiness. In the next section, this methodology will be
used to examine to what extent Latin America and Japan are ideal free
trade partners for the United States.
2.1

The First Tier

Determining ex ante the static, not to mention the dynamic, effects
of an FTA in a Viner-type analysis is empirically quite difficult. There
is an alternative way to estimate the trade diverting potential of an
FTA, however, which is not as empirically cumbersome yet indicates
the general desirability of a trade partner for an FTA. As mentioned
above, this method involves examining some of the potential partner's
trade characteristics. Again, however, these characteristics only imply
what the dynamic effects of an FTA might be.
2.1.1

Trade Characteristics

Upon examining the literature, one finds some degree of agreement over the desirable characteristics in a potential free trade partner
which minimize the trade diverting potential of an FTA. 5" The sum of
the agreement is the following:
Trade creation is likely:
" If the countries negotiating the FTA are already significant trading partners.5 7 In such a situation, an FTA will only reinforce the
potential partner's existing relationship and pattern of comparative advantage. The experience of the European Community is
illustrative in this regard. A prime reason for the greater success
of the European Community than the European Free Trade Association is the greater amount of pre-union trade that existed between European Community members.5 8
* If each partner is the "principal supplier to the other of the products which it exports to the other and if each is the principal mar-

56. See ALl M. EL-AGRAA, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1982);
MIROSLAV

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1992); MEADE,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (4th Ed. 1993);
JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950).
JOVANOVIC,

INTERNATIONAL

supra note 54; DOMINICK
57.
58.

SALVATORE,
SALVATORE,

SALVATORE,

supra note 56, at 233-45;
supra note 56, at 233-45.

MEADE,

supra note 54, at 107.
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ket for the other of the products which it imports from the
other."" This indicates that the potential partners are the lowestcost producers of the goods which they import from each other.
As discussed in section 1, forming an FTA with the low-cost producer favors trade creation.
If the partners' economies are actually competitive or similar
rather than complimentary or dissimilar.6 0 Under these circumstances members will continue to import external goods in which
no member has a comparative advantage. These conditions also
indicate that there are greater possibilities for specialization in
production. Consider two countries, both with a comparative advantage in autos and auto parts, but with one especially suited to
produce automobiles and the other especially able to manufacture
auto parts. The auto parts producer has by protection manufactured some high-cost autos, while the automobile manufacturer
has by protection produced some high-cost auto parts. Under such
conditions, both countries are producing autos and auto parts. After forming an FTA, and thus eliminating barriers, one will eventually concentrate more fully on creating autos and the other will
concentrate on auto parts.
" If the partners' combined proportion of the world's wealth is
great.6 1 This will both improve the likelihood of economies of
scale and increase the scope for dynamic trade expansion within
the area. In the extreme, an FTA between all of the world could
not result in any trade diversion. It follows, then, that the greater
the degree of the world's production, consumption, and trade i.e., the greater degree of the world's wealth - the less likely is
trade diversion.
These four trade characteristics favor trade creation over trade diversion. Each could also indicate the FTA's potential for dynamic trade
creation, although the third and fourth characteristics are perhaps the

59.

MEADE,

supra note 54, at 108-09; see also SALVATORE, supra note 56, at 233-

45.
60. Id.

61. Id. See also HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 38. Trade creation is also
likely if the pre-FTA trade barriers between partners are significant; if after the FTA
is formed the average level of external tariffs of members is low; and if the parties'
trade consists of goods with high supply and demand elasticities. See note 55. Because
of the difficulty of obtaining information, these other characteristics are not examined.
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more important indicators of this potential. The first and second characteristics suggest that the potential partners are good export platforms
to one another, and, since an FTA would only improve this, they suggest that the FTA might attract FDI. However, hey are not strong indicators of the important FDI dynamic effect. The third characteristic
implies that competition will increase. Firms will compete based on
their comparitive advantages, on macroeconomic factors such as savings and investment rates, and on their ability to innovate; they will not
compete on the basis of how much protection their government affords
them. The fourth characteristic implies that economies of scale, which
are usually hindered by trade barriers, are more likely to result from
the enlarged market - thus greater dynamic effects will result.
Overall, it is important to remember that these assertions are generalizations. There may undoubtedly be conceivable circumstances in
which each one of the characteristics may not prove to be universally
valid. Still, these characteristics are suggestive of the possible welfare
effects of an FTA, and they will be employed in the next section to
analyze Latin America and Japan as potential free trade partners for
the United States.
2.2

The Second Tier

As mentioned above, the second tier of this model focuses on how
ready a potential partner is to enter an FTA. It examines
macroeconomic, social, and political factors which favor the success of
an FTA. Again, these factors do not indicate what the trade effects of
an FTA might be; they indicate readiness. Still, readiness is an important issue. Perhaps a country looks ideal from a strictly trade viewpoint, but its macroeconomy is unstable, or its social conditions are
poor, or it has a non-democratic government. If such were the case,
then the potential partner would not be as ideal. The discussion below
reveals why.
2.2.1

Macroeconomic and Social Readiness Indicators

Macroeconomic and social conditions affect the pattern of free
trade. An economy which is typified by such things as "volatile and
high inflation" or "wildly fluctuating exchange rates" is incompatible
as a partner in "any sustained program of international economic liber' Nothing may help sustain open trade policies more
alization." 62
than a

62. See HUFBAUER &

SCHOTT,

supra note 38, at 72.
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stable macroeconomic environment. 63
A hypothetical
example illustrates the importance of
macroeconomic and social conditions for an FTA. Suppose that large
income disparities between potential partners exist. Low income in one
country implies low wages and poor social conditions and economic infrastructure in that country. Upon integration with the wealthier and
thus more industrialized country, the wage and infrastructure differences might lead to very dramatic contractions and expansions of industries in both countries. Such conditions would be destabilizing. Also,
the large disparity in social conditions - e.g., minimum wage, education, health and safety, and environmental standards - may require
harmonization to avoid "social dumping. '64 This means either the
poorer partner will have to introduce expensive changes to its society,
or the wealthier partner will have to make unwise reductions in its
standards. Given the bargaining power and typically greater degree of
independence of the wealthier country, the former is more likely. In
sum, great differences in social conditions and income implies that the
6
FTA may involve dramatic and, perhaps, overwhelming change. 5
Macroeconomic and social criteria, then, are quite important for the
potential success of an FTA and should be examined after the trade
characteristics of the candidate country.
Which macroeconomic indicators should be examined? The history of attempts at FTAs suggests some important guideposts for
ascribing a candidate country's readiness. Hufbauer and Schott outline
some of these factors, and part of their analytical framework is borrowed in this study.66 Some of the factors they consider include real
effective exchange rate stability, price stability, and reliance on trade
taxes. They also include some qualitative assessment of the extent of
market-oriented policies. This study adds a qualitative assessment of
social conditions. Significant disparities between these factors suggest
that an FTA may, at the least, be simply undesirable and, at the most,
wholly counterproductive.

63. DANi RODRIK, THE RUSH TO FREE TRADE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: WHY
So LATE? WHY Now? WILL IT LAST? at 39 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper Series No. 3947, 1992). See also MICHAEL MICHAELY ET AL., LIBERALIZING FOREIGN TRADE: LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

(1991).
64. Interview with Frank Garcia, Assistant Professor of International Business &
Trade Law, Florida State University, in Tallahassee, Fla. (May 1, 1995).
65. See HUFBAUER

AND SCHOTT,

supra note 38, at 64; see also RICHARD S.

BELOUS & JONATHAN LEMCO, NAFTA AS A MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT: THE BENEFITS
AND COSTS OF MERGING HIGH AND Low WAGE AREAS (1993).

66. See

HUFBAUER AND SCHOTT,

supra note 38, at 72-77.
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PRICE STABILITY AND CURRENCY STABILITY: Inflation matters. History shows that a pattern of high inflation correlates with a pattern of
highly variable inflation. High variable inflation rates wrench and twist
the economy and can, by causing drastic changes in the real effective
exchange rate, lead to mania and depression in trade. Such circumstances are negative for FTAs and increase trade friction.6 7

RELIANCE ON TRADE TAXES:

A high reliance on trade taxes reduces

the likelihood that a country will be willing to forego this revenue. Even
if it did desire to do so, trade liberalization in such a case would lead to
macroeconomic instability which negatively affects trade. It will also
require a large change in the state's tax structure; consequently, the
most affected tax-payers might attempt to undermine the FTA. Such
conditions do not favor the success of an FTA.
EXTENT OF MARKET-ORIENTED POLICIES:

If an economy is not mar-

ket-oriented, then an FTA is probably meaningless. As Hufbauer and
Schott point out, with significant portions of an economy in state control "free trade is at best a nuisance," for "state enterprises or highly
regulated firms [do not] wish to respond to market signals, and their
first line of defense is to block those signals by undermining trade
agreements." 8
SOCIAL CONDITIONS:

Poor social conditions suggest that a country

has poor labor, health, and environmental standards. If a country has
poor social conditions and wants to integrate with a country with significantly higher standards, then it will probably have to improve its
standards. Otherwise, since it does not have to pay the same relative
minimum wage or live up to the same safety, environmental, and health
standards, its costs will be cheaper. This implies that it will have an
unfair competitive advantage which might become a future source of
tension in the FTA.
Like the trade characteristics outlined in the previous sub-section,
these macroeconomic and social factors will be examined in the next
section to test Latin America and Japan as potential free trade
partners.
2.2.2

Level of Democracy

The abundance of literature on the economics of FTAs contrasts
sharply with the amount of information available on the requisite political factors for a successful FTA. There is almost no information on
this subject. There is much new and interesting work currently being

67. Id.
68. Id. at 76.
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conducted on regime type and methods of conflict resolution, however,

and these theories, some of which focus on war, 69 offer some insights
into the importance of regime type for cooperative efforts like an
FTA. 70 By adapting some of their principals, this section seeks to con-

tribute to an understanding of liberal democracy as a necessary condition for a successful FTA.71
Before discussing regime type, it is important to make an assumption clear. In many senses, the economics of FTAs might be an afterthought in their formation. There are two aspects to this perception

that FTAs are politics-based. First, the reasons for which FTAs are
negotiated are usually political. Europe serves as the supreme example
of this. After World War II, France viewed economic union as the best
way to prevent its considerable history of hostilities with Germany
from erupting again into another world war. The coercion and the insurance hypotheses (discussed above) about the underlying causes of
FTA formation point to the fundamental role of politics as well. Second, and most important, the implementation and regulation of FTAs
- referred to collectively as the execution of FTAs - is political. It is
7
this second aspect of execution which is of the most concern. 1

69. A major theory regarding war and democracies is called the Democratic
Peace theory. Maoz and Russett argue, with quite robust empirical proof, that democracies almost never, and by some criteria never, fight each other. They develop both a
normative and structural argument to explain why this is the case. The normative argument is discussed below. See Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural

Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986, 87

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

624-38 (1993).
70. Also, a commitment to democratic norms is a prerequisite for E.U. membership. It is a "democratic club," so to speak.
71. Russett uses an eleven-point scale (0-10) to rate a state's level of democracy.
See Maoz & Russett, supra note 69. This scale is based on the aggregation of five
measurements formulated by Ted R. Gurr: the competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment,
openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. See e.g.,
Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr, Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III

Data, 32

JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH

469 (1995). Countries which score above a

five are labeled as democratic (a reasonable degree of competitiveness of political participation, etc.), whereas countries which score below a five are labeled as nondemocratic.
72. See Daniel S. Sullivan, Effective International Dispute Settlement and the
Necessary Condition of a Liberal Democracy, 81 GEO. L. J. 2369, 2396-412 (1993).
The negotiating process is also wholly political. Negotiators take into account interest
group and business lobbies; these groups may even be their prime concern. Also, negotiators try to wean more concessions from the other parties than they themselves concede. See GENE GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE POLITICS OF FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No.
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FTAs, as discussed above in the first section, are as much about
rules, procedures and governance as they are about trade barriers. By
forming an FTA parties agree to a set of rules governing their trade
relationship, and adherence to these rules is regulated by some form of
dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). In the most effective type of
FTA, the DRM has what Sullivan calls a "sovereignty-impinging nature."73 This means that they have the jurisdiction and mandate to
make rulings on matters heretofore regulated only by state courts.
More specifically, this means that the DRM allows a tribunal or panel
"to rule upon (and in some cases strike down) the legality of a state's
laws, as well as the validity of a state's application of its own laws if
those laws violate the [FTA] ."4 The most effective FTAs also have the
requirement of effective compliance. 75 This means that the decisions
which arise from the dispute resolution process are necessarily complied with by the parties involved.
As a consequence of this need for effective compliance and some
infringement upon sovereignty, the parties involved need to be democratic.7 61 According to Sullivan, an examination of DRMs found in the
European Union (European Court of Justice), the European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights), and the
CUSFTA (the AD/CVD binational panel process), on the one hand,
and of the International Court of Justice, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, and the DRM of the Organization of American States human
rights system (the Inter-American Court of Human Rights), on the
other hand, reveals that there is strong evidence of the correlation between effective DRMs and liberal democracies."' This evidence provides the foundation for the argument that effective DRMs, and therefore effective FTAs, will occur only between liberal democracies.78
79
Why?

4597, 1993). This political aspect, however, is political in a different sense, in that it is
a contest over economic interests.
73. See Sullivan, supra note 72, at 2370.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See note 70 for a discussion of how to rate a state as democratic or nondemocratic.
77. See Sullivan supra note 72, at 2370.
78. Id.
79. A counter-factual argument discussed by Sullivan bears emphasizing here. If
instead of democracy one explains the success of the CUSFTA, the European Court of
Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights as having to do with cultural, geographic, and economic ties, then why are there no institutions with effective dispute
resolution mechanisms in regions like Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East?
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The Democratic Peace (DP) theory developed by Maoz and Russett,80 although meant to address why democracies almost never fight
one another, provides insight into why FTAs with effective DRMs are
best formed between democracies. The first assumption of the normative model of the DP theory posits that "states, to the extent possible,
externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions."8 1 This assumption suggests that the norms of domestic political behavior will be
expressed in international conduct. Thus, when two democracies confront one another they apply democratic norms to their interaction.
Democratic political norms emphasize adherence to transparent rules
and solving disputes through compromise. Such practices generally
translate into mutual respect, trust, and accommodation among conflicting democracies and imply that parties will abide by the rules of
their agreements - e.g., FTAs. This is not the case with non-democracies. Rather than adherence to common rules, non-democratic political
norms emphasize coercion and zero-sum conflict resolution. Such practices generally translate into an atmosphere of fear and distrust within
and outside the government and imply that parties will more likely
reneg on their agreements - e.g., FTAs.8"
The second assumption of the normative model of DP theory suggests that "the anarchic nature of international politics implies that a
clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by
the latter, rather than by the former." 83 This assumption means that,
because democratic norms are more easily exploited than non-democratic ones, "democracies are more likely to shift norms when confronted by a non-democratic rival than is the non-democratic rival to
shift to democratic forms of international conduct." 8" A crucial aspect
of this assumption is that democratic states are also likely to assume
non-democratic political norms when confronting democratic states
perceived to be unstable. Maoz and Russett state that "uncertainty
about the commitment to democratic norms by a state with which one
has a conflict of interest may lead to perceptions and expectations that
it will practice these norms imperfectly." 81 Therefore, if a democracy
enters an FTA with what it perceives to be an unstable democracy,

Only the lack of democracy in these regions effectively explains why. Id.
80. See supra note 69.
81. Maoz & Russett, supra note 69, at 625.

82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id.
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then it is more likely to defect from the rules of that FTA and not to
accept judgments made by the DRM.8 6
In sum, if a democratic state is to subjugate itself to the rulings of
a DRM in an FTA, then the parties involved must be stable democracies. If both parties are not stable democracies, then the more democratic state is more likely to ignore the rules of the FTA or the rulings
of the DRM. In other words, it will not effectively execute the FTA.
This is not to say that a stable democracy will not do the same with
other stable democracies; rather, the extension of democratic political
norms - with their emphasis on mutual respect and trust - to like
parties will discourage such a defection, for "dependence on democratic
cost-benefit calculations toward further support of
norms tip rational
87
norms."
these
Like the trade characteristics and macroeconomic factors outlined
above, a state's level of democracy will be examined in the next section
to test Latin America and Japan as ideal free trade partners for the
United States.
The analysis above outlined an ideal free trade partner model. The
primary tier of the model examined those trade characteristics which
favor, in a static sense, trade creation over trade diversion; in judging
the possible dynamic effects of an FTA, however, the model is not as
illustrative. The model also focused on some non-trade characteristics
which favor the success of an FTA in the long run. These
macroeconomic, social, and political factors, however, do not indicate
what the trade diversion effects of an FTA might be, and therefore are
necessarily part of a secondary level of analysis. This model is used in
the next section to examine to what extent Latin America and Japan
are ideal free trade partners.
Section 3: Japan Versus Latin America
President Bush presented the EAI as the starting point for the negotiation of a WHFTA. Ever since, the focus for the next U.S. FTA
has been on Latin America. At the time of this writing, the United
States, Mexico and Canada appear ready to negotiate NAFTA accession for Chile. Indeed, many expect these negotiations to go smoothly

86. There is a question as to how unstable a democracy would need to be before it
would be perceived as unstable. Where such "cut-off" points lie is an area for further
research in democratic peace theory. A possible answer lies in JAMES L. RAY, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: AN EVALUATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

212 (1995).
87. Maoz & Russett, supra note 69, at 625.

PROPOSITION

1996]

IDEAL FREE TRADE PARTNERS

and for Chile to be the first partner accepted in the formation of a
WHFTA. While this is the direction of current U.S. trade policy, some
fundamental questions about this policy should be asked. Is Latin
America, on the whole, an ideal free trade partner? Are any of the
countries within it even ready for an FTA with the NAFTA members?
If not, then who is? The significant trade relationship the United States
has with Japan (as well as the European Union) indicates that it might
be an ideal partner.8 8 How, then, do Japan and Latin America
compare?
Using the ideal free trade partner model presented in the last section, these important questions are answered below. Before beginning,
however, a note regarding methodology is warranted. Comparing Latin
America to Japan involves a different level of analysis; Japan is a state,
while Latin America is not. Nevertheless it is useful to compare the
two. Aggregate trade figures can be compiled for Latin America.
Therefore there is no problem in comparing the two actors on the first
tier trade characteristics of the ideal free trade partner model. The second tier readiness factors are more difficult to aggregate, but by using a
scale to rate performance in individual countries, a Latin American average can be computed. This permits Latin America to be artificially
yet legitimately examined as a single actor. The same can be said for
Latin America's sub-regional groupings like the Mercosur, the Andean
Group, and the CACM; and their patterns and volumes of trade are
selectively compared to Japan's. Their performance on the readiness
factors are also compared to Japan's. On the individual country level,
since Chile appears to be on the verge of NAFTA accession, particular
attention is paid to its readiness factors; however, other countries are
only selectively compared to Japan. This three-step approach - comparing Latin America to Japan on trade characteristics and readiness
factors, comparing the sub-regional groupings to Japan selectively on
trade characteristics and consistently on readiness factors, and comparing Chile to Japan selectively on trade characteristics and consistently
on readiness factors - is employed below. 89

88. The European Union is, when compared to Asia and Latin America, the most
auspicious area for the United State's future economic success. See Clayton Yeuter &
Warren H. Maruyama, A NAFTA for Europe, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1995, at A14.
See also N.Y. TIMES, passim May, 1995.
89. For reasons of space and the availability of data, not all Latin American countries (e.g. Belize, Panama) nor associations (such as CARICOM) are examined in this
study.
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Comparison of Trade Characteristics

To review, the characteristics are: one, the significance of the trading partner; two, whether the partner is a principal market and a principal supplier; three, the competitiveness of the economies; and four,
the wealth of the partner.
3.1.1

Trade Characteristic 1 -

Trading Partner Significance

By comparison, how significant are Latin America and Japan as
U.S. trade partners? To answer this question, it is necessary to show
the extent of U.S. trade with Japan and Latin America in both dollar
terms and as a percentage share of U.S. exports and imports. Table 1
presents the dollar amount of U.S. exports and imports to these areas
in 1992. Table 2 presents the percentage share for these areas in the
same year.
From the numbers, Japan is clearly a more significant trading
partner than Latin America. Japan is 1.4 times a better customer for
U.S. exports, and it is 2.9 times a better provider of U.S. imports. Thus
if the United States liberalized trade in goods with all twenty countries
included in Latin America's figures, it still would not be liberalizing
more than it trades with Japan. If compared at a level below Latin
America, Japan is 4.3 times a better customer than the Andean Group
(the best sub-regional grouping customer and provider), and it is 7.0
times better the provider. Also, Japan is 8.3 times a better customer
than Brazil (the best country customer), and 11.5 times a better provider than Venezuela (the best country provider). In comparison with
Chile, Japan is 19.4 times a better customer and 61.2 times the better
provider.
These findings show how much more significant U.S.-Japan trade
relationship is than the U.S.-Latin America trade relationship in terms
of dollar amounts. They suggest, therefore, that an FTA between the
United States and Japan will lead primarily (if not exclusively) to
trade creation. The reason is simple: an FTA will only reinforce the
two countries' existing relationship and pattern of comparative advantage. Meanwhile, the relative insignificance of Latin America as a U.S.
trading partner suggests that an FTA with it will lead to some modest
degree of trade diversion.
3.1.2

Trade Characteristic 2 - Principal Market and Principal
Supplier

As previously stated, trade creation is likely if each partner is the
"principal supplier to the other of the products which it exports to the
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other and if each is the principal market for the other of the products
which it imports from the other." 90 To examine this characteristic fully
requires an examination of the top exports for Japan, Latin America,
and the United States, as well as an examination of the destination of
these top exports. Unfortunately, the information on the destination of
Japan's and Latin America's top exports was not available to this
study. For this reason, the principal market characteristic discussed by
Meade is not fully answered here.
As a substitute, this study examines only the top U.S. exports.
There is a caveat here as well. The only data on the destination of
particular U.S. exports available to this study came from the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Trade Data Bank. It, however, only
breaks down U.S. exports into entire industries - such as cereals, represented by a two-digit harmonization code - or specific products like frozen King Crabs, represented by a ten digit harmonization
code.9 1 This study compares the industries rather than the specific
products. Even at this level of analysis, however, there is still a further
caveat. To reveal the principal market characteristic requires analysis
of all the countries to which the top U.S. industries export. Only then
can it be established which country is a principal market. Instead of
performing such an in-depth analysis, however, this study assumes a
cut-off point - any country which imports at least 10% of the goods
exported by the top U.S. industries for exports is a principal market.
With the above constrictions and guidelines in mind, this study
analyzes whether Japan and Latin America are principal markets for
U.S. industry exports. Tables 3 and 4 show the principal market characteristic for Japan and Latin America. Table 3 lists the top nine U.S.
industries for exports in 1991. Each of these industries had exports
worth over $10 billion in 1991. The cut-off point of $10 billion works
rather well; there are no industries with exports in the $9 to $10 billion
range.
Using 1991 as the year of comparison, Table 4 reveals for which
industries Japan and Latin America were principal markets between
1988 and 1991.92 Japan is a principal market for four top U.S. industries, while Latin America is a principal market for only one. If the
10% cut-off point is relaxed to 7.5 %, then Japan is a principal market

90. MEADE, supra note 54, at 108-09.

91. The NTDB also has three-digit, five-digit, and seven-digit harmonization
codes. The export and import by country tables, however, do not have this data.
92. (avg. of gds. (1988-91) exported to L.A. (Japan) for top 9 U.S. industries for
exports x 100)/(avg. of gds. (1988-91) exported from world for top 9 U.S. industries
for exports).
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for seven of the nine industries, and Latin America is a principal market for four. This shows that Japan, despite its supposedly "closed"
economy, is a significantly more important market for top U.S. export
industries than is Latin America, despite the latter's geographic
proximity.
Tables 5 and 6 show the principal supplier characteristics for Japan and Latin America. Table 5 lists the top eleven U.S. industries for
imports in 1991. Four industries normally divided - the apparel knit
and crochet industry, the apparel non-knit industry, the iron and steel
industry, and the articles of iron and steel industry - are consolidated
into two - the apparel articles and accessories industry, and the iron
and steel and articles thereof - for the purposes of this study. Each of
the top industries had exports worth over $7 billion in 1991. Using
1991 as the year of comparison, Table 6 shows for which industries
Japan and Latin America were principal suppliers between 1988 and
1991.11 Japan is a principal supplier for seven industries, while Latin
America is a principal supplier for only two. If the 10% cut-off point is
relaxed to 7.5 %, then Latin America becomes a principal supplier for
three industries and Japan remains at seven. This shows that, despite
its geographic distance, Japan is a significantly more important supplier for top U.S. import industries than Latin America.
A comparison of Tables 4 and 6 further shows the importance of
Japan as a U.S. trade partner. Japan is both a principal market and
supplier for both the organic chemicals and optic, photo etc. industries.
If the cut-off point is relaxed to 7.5 %, then this number increases to
four, adding both the nuclear reactor industry and the electronic machinery industry. Meanwhile, Latin America is both a principal market
and supplier for only the mineral fuel industry. Even if the cut-off point
is relaxed to 7.5 %, there is no change. This strongly suggests that the
United States and Japan have a significantly more mutually beneficial
trade relationship than the United States and Latin America. It also
implies that Japan is a low-cost producer of the goods which U.S. consumers buy the most of, while Latin America is a higher-cost producer
of these goods. The implications of this finding, as illuminated in the
previous section, are that if the United States integrated with Latin
America in these goods, then trade diversion might take place. Consequently, the United States would suffer some loss in the form of government tariff revenue, thus increasing the likelihood that the FTA will

93. (avg. of gds. (1988-91) imported from L.A. (Japan) for top 11 U.S. industries
for imports x 100)/(avg. of gds. (1988-91) imported from world for top 11 U.S. industries for imports).
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reduce both the welfare of the U.S. and world. However, if the United
States integrated with Japan in these goods, then there would be no
associated deadweight loss, and the U.S. economy, along with the
world's, would enjoy a larger expansion of welfare.
3.1.3

Trade Characteristic 3 -

Competitiveness of the Economies

A good way to determine if two economies are competitive is to
compare their revealed comparative advantage indices.9 4 This involves
calculating the ratio of a country's share in world exports of a particular good to the country's share in total world exports. The United Nations' International Trade Statistics Yearbook houses a complete listing
of every country's exports for a given year. It divides these exports into
two-digit, three-digit, and five-digit standard international trade classification (SITC) codes. Because of the intermediate nature of this measure, this study compared exports with a three-digit SITC code.9 8 Tables 10, 13, and 16 show the revealed comparative advantage measure
for the top ten (three-digit SITC code) U.S., Japanese, and Latin
American export goods respectively.
First, this study analyzed whether the Japanese and Latin American economies are competitive with the U.S. economy. Table 7 shows
the approximate share of world exports for Japan, Latin America, and
the United States for the years 1988-1991. Table 8 analyzes the top ten
U.S. export goods for the 1988-1991 period. Table 9 calculates the average country share of the top ten U.S. export goods between 19881991. Tables 10a and 10b show the revealed comparative advantage
indices for these export goods. An index less than one means that a
country does not have a revealed comparative advantage in the good
measured.9 6 Also, the highlighted sections in Tables 10a and 10b show
in which goods the countries have a very similar revealed comparative
advantage and in which they are therefore competitive. A very similar

94.

See

BELA BALASA, JAPAN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

(1988); C.

FRED BERG-

STEN & MARCUS NOLAND, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC CON-

(1993).
95. The two-digit SITC code is like the two-digit NTDB codes used to examine
the principal supplier (market) characteristic in the last sub-section; it is broad. But
this study seeks a more illustrative picture of what goods each economy actually imports than that provided by the two-digit SITC code. Meanwhile, the five-digit SITC
code is too specific. Therefore this study chooses the three-digit SITC code to provide a
more descriptive idea of which goods the economy produces best, while not being so
specific that the data compiled reflects too little of the economy as a whole.
96. These are the goods for which the bullet in the table is to the left of the dotted
FLICT
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revealed comparative advantage means that the indices are within 0.75
points of each other and are both on the same side of the comparative
advantage line. The highlighted sections of the same two tables further
demonstrate in which food groups the countries have a very dissimilar
revealed comparative advantage and in which they are therefore not
competitive. A very dissimilar revealed comparative advantage means
that the indices are at least 0.75 points apart and on opposite sides of
the comparative advantage line.
Table 10a reveals that the United States and Japan are competitive in six of the top U.S. exports, while Latin America is only competitive in three. Also, of the goods in which Japan is not very similar to
the United States, both Japan and the United States have a comparative advantage in two. Therefore, while the two economies may not be
very similar in these goods, they are somewhat comparable. Meanwhile, Latin America has a comparative advantage in none of the
goods in which it is dissimilar to the United States. Table 10b reveals
that Japan is greatly dissimilar to the United States in only two of the
ten goods examined, while Latin America is greatly dissimilar in seven.
Overall, these findings strongly suggest that, at least for the goods
which the United States exports the most, Latin America's economy is
very dissimilar to the U.S. economy, whereas Japan's economy is very
similar to that of the U.S.
Next, this study analyzed the revealed comparative advantage
measure for Latin America's top ten export goods. Table 11 shows
Latin America's top ten export commodities. Table 12 calculates the
average (for years 1988-1991) country share for these Latin American
exports. Tables 13a and 13b show the revealed comparative advantage
index for the top Latin American exports.
Table 13a reveals that the United States, like Japan, is only similar to Latin America in one of its top exports - base metal ores. However, neither the United States nor Latin America has a comparative
advantage in this good. Still, the United States does have a comparative advantage in three of Latin America's top ten exports. In these
goods the United States is at least somewhat similar to Latin America,
and the lesser degree of similarity stems only from Latin America's
extreme competitiveness in these goods. Meanwhile, Table 13b shows
that the United States is very dissimilar to Latin America in six of its
top ten exports and that the comparative advantage differences between
the two economies in these goods are quite large. These findings, when
combined with the findings of Tables 10a and 10b discussed above, not
only suggest but show that, in their most important exports, the United
States and Latin America are not competitive. In other words, the two
economies are very dissimilar, and if they were integrated, then one
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might expect trade diversion to ensue. Even if trade diversion did not
occur, the integration of the two economies would not enhance their
possibilities for specialization in production. In other words, integration
would not provide much in the way of increased efficiency. What, then,
from an economic point of view, would be the point of integrating the
two economies through an FTA rather than through the multilateral
process?
Finally, this study analyzes the revealed comparative advantage
measure for Japan's top ten export goods. Table 14 examines the top
Japanese export goods for the 1988-1991 period, and Table 15 calculates the average country share of these top Japanese exports for the
same years. Tables 16a and 16b show the revealed comparative advantage indices of the three economies for these export goods. While Table
16b shows that the United States is only dissimilar in three of Japan's
top ten export goods, Table 16a reveals both that the United States is
very similar to Japan in five of Japan's top export goods and that the
United States has a comparative advantage in two more of Japan's top
export goods. Furthermore, a comparison of Tables 10a and 16a shows
that six of these top ten Japanese export goods are also top ten U.S.
export goods. This makes clear the striking degree of similarity in the
two economies' industrial composition. These findings imply that if the
two economies integrated, then the possibilities for further specialization in production would be great. Also, there would be little possibility
of trade diversion, for the two economies would continue to import
goods in which neither has a comparative advantage.
3.1.4

Trade Characteristic 4 -

Proportion of the World's Wealth

Like characteristic one, this characteristic is easily examined. Table 17 reports the gross domestic product (GDP), the real GDP per
capita in purchase power parity dollars ($PPP), and the share of world
GDP in 1992. The Japan-U.S. share of world wealth is a staggering
41.6%. With a 12.2% greater share of the world's wealth, Japan's is
approximately 4.3 times wealthier than Latin America. It is 6.0 times
wealthier than the Mercosur grouping (the wealthiest sub-grouping)
and is 10.2 times wealthier than Brazil (the wealthiest country). In
comparison to Chile - the next likely U.S. free trade partner - it is
88.9 times wealthier! When one considers the fact that, on average,
individual Japanese are $15,039 wealthier than Latin Americans in
general, $11,270 wealthier than Venezuelans (the richest of the Latin
Americans), and $12,330 wealthier than Chileans, it becomes apparent
that Japan and Latin America, just like the United States and Latin
America, have very different purchasing powers. Indeed, while U.S. in-
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tegration with Latin America would increase the size of the market to
which U.S. firms have free access by approximately 14.3 %, integration
with Japan would increase it by over 62% .9 Thus while integration
with Latin America would increase the possibilities for economies of
scale for industries like high-technology manufacturing, integration
with Japan would travel much farther towards this goal. Overall, the
sheer size of the Japanese economy makes the scope for trade creation
through integration far greater than that possible through integration
with Latin America.
3.1.5

Summary of the First Tier -

Trade Characteristics Analysis

Overall, the foregoing analysis of the U.S., Japanese, and Latin
American volumes and patterns of trade suggests three unmistakeable
things. First, it is likely that a modest degree of static trade diversion
would result from U.S. integration with Latin America. Second, it is
likely that substantial trade creation and almost no significant trade
diversion will result from U.S. integration with Japan. Third, the likely
scope of dynamic trade creation in the case of U.S.-Latin American
integration would be far less than the likely scope of dynamic trade
creation which would result from U.S.-Japanese integration. There are
reasons why this is so.
Japan is a low-cost producer in most of the industries from which
the U.S. imports the most, therefore the United States would suffer
little deadweight loss due to integration. The net effect for the U.S.
economy from integration with Japan would be undeniable trade creation. Moreover, this trade creation is likely to be substantial because
both economies are very competitive and similar, and the integration of
such economies leads to a greater degree of specialization in production. In other words, because of their similarities, eventually the two
economies would be much more likely to become increasingly interdependent, and thus merge into one inclusive whole, rather than remaining as two distinctive economies. This would be similar in a case of
integration between two complimentary economies. Such integration
can only improve world welfare, and especially the welfare of the two
countries. The only concern for the rest of the world would be that the
two merging economies would be so strong as to hold monopoly power
over the rest of the world in their top exports. Lastly, since the two
economies combined represent over 40% of the world's wealth, integration would greatly improve the likelihood of economies of scale, and
97. These percentages do not take into account the access U.S. firms already enjoy in Canada, Israel, and Mexico.

19961

IDEAL FREE TRADE PARTNERS

thus dynamic trade creation.
None of the above observations can be made about Latin America.
It is not a low-cost producer of top U.S. imports, and therefore integration with it may lead to a deadweight loss for the United States and to
trade diversion for the rest of the world. Its economy is not similar to
the U.S. economy and therefore, the possibilities for specialization in
production would be minimal. And even though integration with Latin
America would increase the size of the market to which U.S. firms
have free access, it is unlikely that this increase would lead to economies of scale. Thus dynamic trade creation would be more likely if the
U.S. integrated with Japan than if the U.S. integrated with Latin
America.9 8
3.2

The Second Tier - Comparison of Readiness Factors and
Levels of Democracy

Recall that the second tier of this ideal free trade partner model is
to be employed if and only if the potential partner fits the ideal trade
characteristics. Strong performance on the readiness indicators, absent
a similar performance on the trade characteristics, is not a justification
for an FTA. The trade characteristics are primary. Therefore, since
under this model's first tier analysis Latin America is not ideal, it
should not be examined further. However, despite this observation, the
United States is in actuality pursuing a WHFTA. Therefore, it is
worthwhile for the purposes of this study to include Latin America nevertheless. The reader should keep in mind, however, that this is not in
keeping with the model's prescribed methodology and that, based on
the trade characteristics, Japan is an ideal free trade partner, whereas
Latin America is not.
Even if Latin America were ideal in terms of the four trade characteristics analyzed in the last section, would it be ready for an FTA
with the United States? The analysis below answers these questions by
examining the macroeconomic, social, and political readiness factors
outlined in the previous section.
To review, the six readiness factors are price stability, real effec-

98. However, even though pre-trade tariff barriers in certain Japanese and Latin
American industries are high, in general Latin American tariff barriers are more significant than Japanese ones. There will be a larger degree of static trade creation than
generally suggested by the model used. Contrarily, Japanese non-tariff barriers, in general, are more significant than Latin American ones. This would hinder a traditional
FTA with Japan from realizing its potential dynamic gains. This point will be returned
to later in this section.
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tive exchange rates, reliance on trade taxes, the extent of market-oriented policies, social conditions, and the level of democracy (freedom).
This study scores the readiness factors on an 11 point scale (10 to 0),
with 10 being the best possible score. It calculates the overall regional
and sub-regional scores by adding the individual country scores together and dividing by the number of countries. This scale method allowed for an average score on readiness factors to be given.
3.2.1

Readiness Factor 1 -

Price Stability

To measure the degree of price stability, this study examined the
four year period 1990-1993 and averaged the percent change in consumer prices over the previous year. This study awarded average inflation rates between 0-2.5% a 10, between 2.5-5% a 9, between 5-10%
an 8, between 10-20% a 7, between 20-35% a 6, between 35-50% a 5,
between 50-75% a 4, between 75-100% a 3, between 100-150% a 2,
between 150-200% a 1, and above 200% a 0.99
Table 18 reports the findings on price stability for 1990-1993.
With only an average of 2.4 % inflation, Japan scored a 10. By comparison, Latin America scored a 4.13; this would place it somewhere between a 50-75 % inflation rate. Even if some of the worst offenders (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Nicaragua) are deleted, the
average for Latin America improves only to a 6.1. The CACM (the
most price-stable grouping) scored a 5.4 - 35-50%. Bolivia (the most
price-stable Latin American country) averaged 14.8% inflation, and
Chile averaged 19.0%; both scored sevens. These findings suggest that,
in general, Latin America's prices are unstable. Such a condition disfavors investment and expansion of trade. Rates much above 20% "call
into question sustained progress on trade and capital liberalization." 10 0
Latin America as a whole needs to achieve a greater degree of price
stabilization before the United States should consider a WHFTA. Even
at a less than hemispheric level, only Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, El
Salvador and Honduras have achieved average inflation rates of less
than the suggested 20% cut-off point, and none of them has achieved
average rates less than 10%.

99. This scale is based on HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 38, at 70. They
employed a 5 to 0 scale and awarded scores on the following basis: inflation rates less
than 5% received a 5, between 5-20% a 4, 20-50% a 3, 50-100% a 2, 100-200% a 1,
and greater than 200% a 0.
100. Id. at 73.

IDEAL FREE TRADE PARTNERS

1996]

3.2.2

Readiness Factor 2 -

Currency Stability

To measure the degree of currency stability, this study calculated
the standard deviation in exchange rates over the period 1990-1992. It
awarded standard deviations between 0-3% a 10, between 3-6% a 9,
between 6-9 % an 8, between 9-12 % a 7, 12-15 % a 6, 15-18 % a 5, 1821% a 4, 21-24% a 3, 24-27% a 2, 27-30% a 1, and more than 30%
a 0.101
Table 19 reports the findings on currency stability for the years
1990-1992. The lowest standard deviation belonged to Bolivia at 0.4; it
scored a ten. Chile had a deviation of 3.3. Japan had a deviation of 4.6;
both countries received a 9. The Andean Group (the best grouping)
also scored a 9.4. Latin America scored an 8.3. Overall, currencies in
Latin America appear to be stable and comparable in this sense to Japan. Based on these findings, none of the Latin American countries
examined here should be eliminated from FTA contention for having
unstable currencies.
3.2.3

Readiness Factor 3 -

Reliance on Trade Taxes

To measure a state's reliance on trade taxes, this study computed
an average for the period 1986-1991 of each state's percentage of government revenue derived from taxes on international trade and transactions. It gave a 10 to countries with averages less than 2.5 %, a 9 between 2.5-5%, an 8 between 5-7.5%, a 7 between 7.5-10%, a 6
between 10-12.5%, a 5 between 12.5-15%, a 4 between 15-17.5%, a 3
between 17.5-20%, a 2 between 20-22.5%, a 1 between 22.5-25%, and
a 0 for anything higher than 25 %.102
Table 20 reports the findings on trade tax reliance for the years
1986-1991. With an average of 1.35%, Japan performed the best. Brazil was not far behind with a 2.17 % average. It is the only Latin
American country with an average less than 10%. Both countries
scored a 10. Chile averaged 10.06% and received a 6. The Mercosur
(the best grouping) scored a 6.25. Overall, however, Latin America
scored a 4.07. This places it somewhere in the 15-17.5% range, and
this is precisely the range at which Hufbauer and Schott argue govern-

101. Id. at 71. In Hufbauer & Schott's 5 to 0 scale they awarded real exchange
rate fluctuations of less than 10% a 5, between 10-30% a 3, and greater than 30% a

0.
102. Id. In their 5 to 0 scale, Hufbauer & Schott awarded countries which derived less than 5% of revenue from trade taxes a 5, between 5-10% a 4, 10-15% a 3,
15-20% a 2, 20-25% a 1, and greater than 25% a 0.
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ments will begin to strongly resist the phasing-out of these revenues. 10 3
3.2.4

Readiness Factor 4 -

Extent of Market-Oriented Policies

This factor seeks to measure the extent to which countries have
privatized and deregulated. Of course, measuring this requires a more
qualitative approach than experienced with the first three readiness
factors. To score performance in their study, Hufbauer and Schott divided Latin America into three groupings: countries with operational
privatization programs and deregulation received a 4 or 5 (8 to 10
here);1 04 countries with plans to privatize and deregulate received a 2
or 3 (4 to 6 here); those without plans scored a 0 or 1 (2 to 0 here).
This study duplicated the results of their findings, but converted their 0
to 5 scale to the 0 to 10 scale used here.
Table 21 reports the scores for the extent of market-oriented policies in 1994. Japan received a 9 while Latin America on the whole
received a 6. Chile (the best country) scored high with a 10. Mercosur
(the best grouping) received a 7. The fact that Chile scored so high and
is the first candidate in line for NAFTA accession suggests that this
factor might have a high degree of salience for U.S. strategists. It may
be noted that Chile also scored high in currency stability, but the other
countries scored high in that category as well.
3.2.5

Readiness Factor 5 -

Social Conditions

Like the market-oriented policies factor, Hufbauer and Schott discuss social conditions as particularly relevant to a state's readiness for
economic integration.1 0 5 However, they do not attempt to score this
factor quantitatively. This study does. It uses a recognized method of
measuring social conditions: life expectancy. 10 It awarded life expec-

103. Id.
104. Id. This study assumes that Hufbauer & Schott gave countries which do not
need privatization programs due to existing low levels of state ownership a score of 5
(translated as a 10 here).
105. Id.
106. See Adrian Karatnycky, Democracies on the Rise, Democracies at Risk, 26
FREEDOM REVIEw 5 (1995). A higher life expectancy rate, foremost, indicates a higher
standard of health care in a nation. One's health, however, is also dependent on social
factors like environmental conditions, work conditions, and the general harshness of
life. For instance, at the turn of the century, life expectancy in the United States at
birth was 32.5 years for males and 35.0 years for females. By 1970 those rates had
increased to 68.0 for males and 75.6 for females. Although advances in medicine surely
contributed greatly to this increase, it would be disingenuous to ignore the importance
of the improved social conditions in the United States as a factor.

1996]

IDEAL FREE TRADE PARTNERS

tancies over 77.5 years a 10, between 75-77.5 a 9, between 72.5-75 an
8, between 70-72.5 a 7, between 67.5-70 a 6, between 65-67.5 a 5,
between 62.5-65 a 4, between 60-62.5 a 3, between 57.5-60 a 2, 5557.5 a 1, and below 55 a 0.
Table 21 also reports the scores for social conditions in 1994. Japan had the highest life expectancy with 78.6 years and scored a 10.
Costa Rica (the highest Latin American country) scored a 9 with a life
expectancy of 76 years. Chile scored a 7 with a life expectancy of 71.9
years. Mercosur (the best grouping) scored a 6.0. Latin America scored
a 5.6. This corresponds to the 65-67.5 range. If the worst offenders are
dropped - below 65: Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru - the average
improves by a half point, becoming a more respectable but still low 6.1.
In as much as a low life expectancy rate can be said to indicate
poor social conditions - e.g., poor environmental and labor standards
- most of Latin America's performance suggests that its accession to
NAFTA may run into opposition in the U.S. Congress. Indeed, antiNAFTA activists from labor and environmental groups have already
vowed to press for more labor and environmental protection in any new
trade pact, and they believe that the Clinton Administration is not
stressing the need for environmental and labor safeguards enough in its
10 7
current discussions with Chile.
3.2.6

Readiness Factor 6 -

Levels of Democracy

How does one judge a state's democracy? Any such assessment is
inherently qualitative. Still, this does not mean that it is inaccurate.
Political scientists widely recognize the accurateness of the measurement of a state's freedom published annually by Freedom House. Although this measurement of freedom does not rate governments per se,
it does rate the rights and freedoms individuals have in each country.
According to Freedom House, "[it] does not score countries and territories based on governmental intentions or constitutions but on real
world situations caused by governmental and non-governmental factors."' 0 8 Therefore this paper utilizes Freedom House figures when appropriate. 10 9 However, because Freedom House uses a scale from 1 to

107. See Asra Q. Nomani, NAFTA Shafta, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1995, at Al.
108. J. E. Ryan, Survey Methodology, 26 FREEDOM REVIEW 10, 19.
109. Freedom House uses two checklists to measure freedom. Its political rights
checklist includes eleven questions (two of which are discretionary) such as: "Is the
head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free
and fair elections;" "[D]o cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have
reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?" Its civil liberties checklist includes
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7, with 1 being the highest score, this study converted their scale to a
10 to 1 scale. In so doing, this author has essentially inverted the Freedom House scale. A 1 became a 7, a 2 became a 6, etc. This number
was multiplied by the ratio of 10 to 7 (or 1.428. . .). Therefore, a score
of I on the Freedom House scale received a 10, a 1.5 a 9.3, a 2.0 an
8.6, a 2.5 a 7.9, a 3.0 a 7.1, a 3.5 a 6.4, a 4.0 a 5.7, a 4.5 a 5, a 5.0 a
4.3, and so on.
Table 22 reports the scores for freedom in 1994. Costa Rica scored
the highest with 9.3, followed by Japan and Chile with a score of 8.6.
Mercosur (the best grouping) scored a 7.5, while Latin America received a 7.19. This means that the state of democracy in Latin
America is fair to good, and suggested that Latin America might be
sufficiently liberal with which to enter into an FTA. However, certain
countries like Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru
should probably be avoided either due to low scores, significant daunting changes in political rights or civil liberties, or general decreasing
trends in freedom.
3.2.7

Overall Scores

Table 23 compiles the overall scores for the readiness factors and
level of freedom. Japan received the highest score with a 9.43. Latin
America received a 5.88. The difference of 3.55 points is quite significant. Overall, Latin America is not as ready for economic integration
as is Japan.
At the sub-regional grouping level, the findings are similar; no
grouping can confidently claim readiness. The CACM, with an overall
score of 5.1, is the least ready. It has a dismal score of 1.2 on trade tax
reliance and only a 3.6 score for the extent of market-oriented policies.
The Andean Group and Mercosur are about equal with overall scores
of 6.11 and 6.04 respectively. Both scored very poorly on price stability
and fair to poor on trade tax reliance and social conditions. These
group findings suggest that if NAFTA wishes to expand into a
WHFTA, it might be necessary to do so on an individual, country-bycountry basis. Nonetheless, the Andean Group is not as unprepared as
its score suggests. Without Peru, its score increases from a 6.11 to a
6.89. Indeed, of its members, every country except Peru - that is, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela - can claim some degree of
readiness. The only other countries that can do so are Costa Rica and

thirteen questions such as: "Is there open public discussion and private discussion?;"
"[Alre there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there
effective collective bargaining?" Id., at 11.
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Chile. Among the Latin American countries which are ready, Chile is
the most prepared with an overall score of 7.93. Based on these figures
it makes sense, then, for the first new member in NAFTA (en route to
the WHFTA) to be this state. However, Japan proved to be the most
ready, scoring an impressive 9.43.
3.3

Conclusion of Japan versus Latin America

The comparison of Latin America and Japan demonstrates two
things. From the point of view of the ideal free trade partner model
employed here, Japan is an ideal free trade partner for the United
States; Latin America is not. It is doubtful, then, that hemispheric free
trade would be the panacean windfall U.S. trade policy-makers may
desire it to be."10 The analysis in this section strongly suggests that the
trade creation benefits of pursuing true liberalization in the U.S.-Japan
trade relationship would be quite large given the two economies' existing levels of interdependence, competitiveness, and wealth.
The ideal free trade partner model developed here does not employ
a measurement of degrees of cultural similarity. Such similarities make
a successful FTA with Latin America more likely than with Japan.
Still, the presence of cultural affinities alone is not a sufficient reason to
pursue economic integration outside of the multilateral framework.
Cultural affinities, whether they stem from a common sense of history,
a common sense of religion, or a common sense of values, are arguments for greater cultural cooperation (such as student-exchange programs), but not for a special economic relationship (such as an FTA).
This study's analysis also does not take into account differences in
market structure which, it can be asserted, may not only prohibit an
FTA from realizing dynamic trade creation, but may also make the
realization of an FTA on any grounds less likely. Despite this fact, the
presence of such differences should not disqualify an FTA approach.
Indeed, although they make an FTA more difficult to negotiate, their
presence in a significant trade relationship - i.e., one that meets the
ideal trade characteristics - as non-tariff barriers makes the negotiation of an FTA aimed at ameliorating such differences all the more
valuable. Also, their presence as non-tariff barriers in a significant
trade relationship justifies establishing a special institutional relationship within GATT.
The U.S.-Japan trade relationship is just such a relationship. Nontraditional access barriers, which are ubiquitous in both economies,

110. See Thomas F. McLarty III, The Americas: Hemispheric Free Trade Is
Still a National Priority, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1995, at A 1l.
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dominate the two countries' trade disputes and might prohibit the realization of the dynamic trade gains FTAs are aimed at capturing. One
could argue that this makes Japan a less ideal free trade partner. On
the contrary, however, this study holds that these non-traditional access
barriers are both the explanation as to why the United States and Japan do not already have an FTA and the reason that their relationship
needs one.
The United States and Japan should fundamentally adjust their
relationship through a JUSFTA. U.S.-Japan disputes have often taken
the form of a Section 301 complaint, holding that Japan's markets are
closed, accompanied by a unilateral demand that Japan agree to market-access targets. Recently, such a complaint over auto trade brought
the two countries to the brink of a trade war (discussed more fully in
section 4). Time magazine recently published an article on the event
entitled the "Launch of an Economic Cold War." ' Written before the
two sides agreed to a plan (outlined in section 4), it stated that "if a
showdown is averted in this spat, another would come soon, and then
another, until one shakes to the core the political relations between the
two economic superpowers." ' 2
Instead of focusing the expertise of its limited number of trade
negotiators and analysts on a small gain like a WHFTA, the United
States should use its limited resources more efficiently by pursuing a
JUSFTA. Diverting its experts' attention away from the underlying
causes of U.S.-Japan trade imbalances will do nothing to solve one of
its most politically charged economic issues. Moreover, continuing to
ignore the core problems which have been weakening the U.S.-Japan
alliance over the past two decades only insures that these problems will
continue the alliance's deterioration. For a nation which wishes to
maintain its current level of influence in world affairs into the twentyfirst century, allowing its most important economic relationship to remain unattended is not wise policy. The United States should maintain
its power by repairing, fortifying, and building upon its most important
economic relationship, not by building a new one to counter it.
The next section looks more closely at some of the problems in the
U.S.-Japan relationship and argues that the political issues separating
the United States and Japan need solving through an FTA approach.
Section five then provides a sketch of a JUSFTA.

111. See George J. Church, Launch of an Economic Cold War, TIME, July 3,
1995, at 30-31.
112. Id., at 30.
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Section 4: Japan-U.S. Trade Relations: The Need for a New
Approach
The comparison of Japan and Latin America in the last section
raised some questions about a WHFTA. Since hemispheric integration
probably would not provide much in the way of increased economic
efficiency, there appears to be no justification for linking Latin America
and the United States through an FTA. In contrast, the Japan-U.S.
pattern and volume of trade should encourage integration because the
two countries have much trade creation to gain from an FTA.
U.S. trade policy makers would be well-advised to consider this
view. Instead of focusing their attention on Latin America, they should
focus their cooperative efforts where they are needed most. They should
recognize that Japan, not Latin America, is the direction in which the
United States should be focusing its institution-building desires. The
U.S.-Japan relationship is deteriorating, and if an economic war begins,
then no one can predict or control how detrimental it will be. By creating a JUSFTA, however, the United States and Japan can avoid the
threat of economic war altogether. They can move past the point of
political posturing and accept the reality of their situation: they need
each other both economically and militarily, and if they are to avoid a
split, they need to begin a serious attempt at mending their straining
ties.
The section that follows discusses the problems in the U.S.-Japan
relationship which are so negative that in the minds of some they warrant threats of trade wars. The problems in the approach of the U.S.
that aggravate these underlying problems are also discussed below.
4.1

U.S.-Japan Distrust

Japan is a vital U.S. trade partner and competitor. The United
States benefits enormously from its trade with Japan and from the
prosperity its trade helps engender. It gains from Japan investing,
building factories, and purchasing government bonds in the United
States. 113
The United States gains from trade with other vital partners including Canada, the European Union, and Mexico. U.S. trade relations
with this group are largely cooperative, however. The U.S. has separate
agreements with Canada, the CUSFTA, and with Mexico and Canada,

113. See
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the NAFTA. With the European Union, although it has yet to institutionalize its trade relationship, it has a significant relationship through
NATO and has shared the stewardship of the international economic
system throughout most of the Cold War.1 1 Although the transatlantic
cooperation may at times be stressed, especially since the end of the
Cold War and the onset of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the appointment of a European to head the new World Trade Organization
demonstrates the underlying fact of cooperation." 5
The term "cooperation" greatly fails to describe the reality of the
relationship shared with Japan. Although U.S. policy-makers and politicians discuss the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship and use
the slogan that the two have a "global partnership" in economic, political, and strategic affairs, their rhetoric is devoid of real content." 6 The
U.S.-Japan partnership does not seem to exist.
What best describes the U.S.-Japan relationship is unfriendliness
and distrust. In 1993 the New York Times reported that polls conducted jointly by it, CBS News, and Tokyo Broadcasting between July
1985 and June 1993 found 64% of Japanese characterized U.S.-Japan
relations as unfriendly; 45 % of Americans believed that Japan competes unfairly; and 85 % of the Japanese thought that the United
7
States was unjustly blaming Japan for its economic difficulties.1
These results show why some observers believe that if the two economies were not so interdependent, and if Japan did not depend on the
United States for its security, the two states might have parted ways
some time ago. 1 8
Some of the U.S. hostility toward Japan reflects its frustration
with relatively poor economic performance in the 1980s and the result-

114. This co-stewardship is symbolized by the fact that a European is usually chosen as head of the International Monetary Fund, while an American is usually chosen
as head of the World Bank.
115. Admittedly, the two are very competitive, and the United States only accepted the European candidate after its candidate, former President Salinas of Mexico,
withdrew his name from competition because of the economic troubles in Mexico and
the arrest of his brother in connection with the murder of a prominent Mexican official.
116. See Morton I. Abramowitz, Foreword to CARNEGIE i, supra note 113 at viii;
ROBERT M. KIMMITT, U.S.-JAPAN: DEFINING OUR GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP (U.S. Department of State, 1989); W. ALLEN WALLIS, U.S. AND JAPAN: PARTNERS IN GLOBAL
ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP (U.S. Department of State, 1988).
117. David E. Sanger, 64% of JapaneseSay U.S. Relations Are Unfriendly, N.Y.
July 16, 1993, at Al.
118. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA & KONG DAN OH, THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AFTER THE COLD WAR (1993); see also Kuroda, supra note 9.

TIMES,

1996]

IDEAL FREE TRADE PARTNERS

ing tendency to look for foreign scapegoats.11 9 Some of the U.S. dissatisfaction with Japan can also be characterized as ethnocentrism.' 2 0
Critics state that Japan is unable to play by the rules; that Japan's
traders are predatory and hence need to be restrained;12' and that
rules-oriented trade is not possible with Japan. 2 The same cultural
bias leads many officials to argue that Japan is an abnormal2 state in
that it operates a fundamentally different type of capitalism.1 1
4.2

Japan is Different

The notion that Japan is somehow different and closed is an issue
which dominates U.S.-Japan disputes.' 2 Politicians and, for lack of a
better term, "Japan-bashers" believe that the differences are fundamental. That is, Japan will continue to maintain "opaque protection"
of its markets, while the United States will keep its "relatively transparent openness;"' 126 that Japan cannot successfully be approached
therefore the United States
through the traditional processes; and that
26
policies.
results-oriented
pursue
should
To be sure, there are significant differences between the two economies due to their different styles of financial markets, labor-management relations, industrial policy, and corporate governance, but the notion that Japan's different style of capitalism makes it impossible to do
business there has not yet been supported econometrically. 12 Addition-

119. BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 4.
120. BHAGWATI 1991B, supra note 23, at 24 (1991).
121. Id., at 27-28.
122. Meanwhile, the reverse implication is that U.S. firms are benign and fair. Id.
at 28.
123. Id. at 32.
124. The most cited evidence of Japan's un-openness is its low propensity to import. CARNEGIE, supra note 113, at 26. Some studies, however, demonstrate that Japan's level of imports is normal given its triangular trade. Gary Saxonhouse, The
Micro- and Macro-Economics of Foreign Sales to Japan, in TRADE POLICIES IN THE
1980S 259 (William Cline ed., 1983); Edward Learner, Measure of Openness, in
TRADE POLICY ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 147 (Robert E. Baldwin ed., 1988).
Still, the issue of openness persists. Unfortunately, the perception of un-openness leads
to the reality of un-openness, for the perception discourages attempts at penetration by
U.S. firms.
125. BERGSTEN & NOLAND,supra note 94, at 8.

126. Id. at 7.
127. Id. Structural non-tariff barriers do exist in Japan. This is indisputable. They
include product liability, competition policy, FDI restrictions, and rules on intellectual
property rights. Id. at 72. How significant these barriers are, however, is controversial.
Another structural barrier is the Japanese keiretsu. Japanese industry is highly concentrated, and it is often concentrated through keiretsu. Keiretsu are networks of firms
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ally, the U.S. rhetoric concerning the trade deficit with Japan is not
well-rooted in empirical studies.1 28 Also, the varying styles are neither
set nor immutable. In fact, the two styles appear to be converging, a
process which will likely "accelerate with the increasing internationalization of both economies."' 1 9 This convergence is occurring for two
reasons. First, U.S. economic weaknesses require reform and emulation
of foreign models like Japan's. 3 0 Second, Japan's consumers want an
increased standard of living and a less hostile relationship with the
United States. 131
The differing styles of capitalism are not the most serious
problems in the U.S.-Japan relationship. The most fundamental issues
are the U.S. budget deficit and Japan's global current account surplusses. Despite claims to the contrary by policy-makers and trade
negotiators, these macro-imbalances are the underlying cause of the
U.S. trade deficit with Japan. 13 2 The reasons for this are well known:
the U.S. budget deficit crowds out saving and investment; the United
States must rely on foreign savings to finance its debt and investment
needs; much of this financing comes from Japan, which saves twice as
much as the United States; 3 3 and these realities are a consequence of
the emphasis on consumption in the United States and the emphasis on
saving and investment in Japan."3
Still, even in the absence of these problems, the U.S.-Japan relationship would not be problem-free. For one, trade tensions are an inherent problem for any significant trade relationship. Two, the competi-

with financial, managerial, and product market interlinkages. They are largely exclusionary, but they are probably also efficiency-enhancing. Id. at 74. Bergsten and Noland distinguish three roles of the keiretsu. The first role is as the financial links which
allow for longer time horizons, thus allowing a focus on market share. The second is as
the vertical integration of producers and suppliers which allows for increased information exchange. The third is as the distribution links. (The distribution links are not
efficiency-enhancing.) Id. at 75.
128. BHAGWATI 1991A, supra note 5, at 67.
129. BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 11.
130. Some methods worth adopting are long-term rather than short term investing, patient profit-seeking, emphasis on long-term market-share, and just-in-time inventory practices (which has already been borrowed). Id. at 12.

131. Id.; See also Funabashi, supra note 11 at 20.
132. See BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94; Stephen D. Cohen, United StatesJapan Trade Policies, 37 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 12236 (1990); CARNEGIE, supra note 113, at 21, 25-29; Takatoshi Ito, U.S.-Japan
Macroeconomic Policy Coordination, in JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 81, supra
note 11; and Kuroda, supra note 9.
133. BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 36.
134. See KRUGMAN, supra note 9.
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tiveness and similarity of the U.S. and Japanese economies (shown in
the last section) almost ensure conflict. 138 For this reason, when searching for solutions, the microeconomic dimension of the relationship must
be considered alongside the macroeconomic one.
4.3

Managed Trade

It is the microeconomic issue (or sectoral issue) which has the
most salience in the U.S. political debate, and U.S. trade policy has
responded by seeking managed trade with Japan. The managed trade
approach is characterized by the use of Section 301 to obtain market
access agreements. Fundamentally, managed trade agreements set numerical targets for market share - e.g., 20% of Japan's market for
semiconductors guaranteed to U.S. firms - that a government is legally bound to fulfill. In other words, instead of allowing market conditions to decide how much trade is conducted, managed trade requires
the politically agreed market shares to be the basis of how much trade
takes place. The Clinton Administration professes (as did the Bush Administration before it) that such market access agreements open markets and counter the trade deficit. However, as Schott states, "[t]rade
negotiations - and other trade policy measures, whether pursued unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally - can do little to correct the
U.S. trade deficit."' 136
The Clinton Administration currently pursues managed trade with
Japan.' Managed trade comes in two main forms: voluntary export
restraints (VERs) and voluntary import expansions (VIEs). 3 8 Two examples, the 1981 Auto Agreement (VER) and 1986 Semiconductor
Agreement (VIE), illustrate why these policies are negative.

135. See BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94. The two economies compete headon in industries like financial services, autos, and high-technology manufacturing. Id. at
1.
136. Schott, supra note 16, at 53.
1 137. The Clinton Administration prefers to label its trade policy as "cautious activism." Free Trade Policy or Protectionism? Clinton Aids Prefer "Cautious Activism," BNA INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, Dec. 9, 1992, at 2113. Former Clinton

Treasury Secretary Altman rationalizes U.S. policy this way: "The United States is not
seeking targets. The issues are goals and measurability. In any particular sector, the
U.S. aim is to negotiate a series of long-term goals and objective standards against
which progress can be judged." Roger C. Altman, Why Pressure Tokyo?, 73 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 2, 4 (1994). Altman's rhetoric is not convincing. He and other decision-makers
can characterize U.S. policy in any manner they wish, but they cannot change the
underlying fact that managed trade is what they describe.
138. They are voluntary only in the sense that other nations agree to them. Such
agreement only comes after threats of U.S. sanctions.
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Concern over autos mounted in the 1970s and led to the 1981
Auto Agreement. By 1979, when the second oil crisis hit, fuel efficient
Japanese autos had captured 25 % of the U.S. market. In turn, the Big
Three U.S. auto-makers pursued an unprecedented lobbying effort to
gain protection. Congress responded with threats of limiting auto imports. Under enormous pressure, Japan reluctantly agreed to limit their
auto exports to the United States.13 9
The 1981 Auto Agreement had five results. One, it increased auto
prices significantly. Two, it forced Japan's auto firms to establish a cartel to limit exports. Three, Japan's factories established firms in the
United States to avoid the restrictions. Four, Japan's firms shifted production from low-end to top-end autos, thus earning higher profits and
increasing the deficit in autos. Five, the agreement spurred debate between the United States and Japan. 1 0
Another source of continuing debate has been the 1986 Semiconductor Agreement. The United States negotiated this agreement to
counter this industry's $2.5 billion deficit with Japan. The agreement
had set floor prices for Japanese semiconductor exports to the United
States, and promised U.S. companies a 20% share in Japan's
market.""1
The 1986 Semiconductor Agreement had five outcomes. It capped
U.S. firms' share of the Japanese market at 20%. Prices for semiconductor chips increased to many times their previous level, but virtually
all of the firms at the time were from Japan. The agreement had a net
effect of transferring wealth from U.S. consumers to Japanese producers. Japan failed to fulfill the target, and the United States imposed
sanctions.""
Managed trade agreements like the 1986 Semiconductor Agreement should be viewed with skepticism for five reasons more fully discussed below. They necessarily force the foreign government to become
more involved in its firms' affairs. They use political power rather than
economic competitiveness as the determinate of trade outcomes. They
require attention to details that are not easily resolved. They are likely
to be captured politically. They encourage bickering rather than coop14 8
eration in the countries' relationship.
First. Managed trade necessarily increases a foreign government's
involvement in its economy. This sort of trade forces bureaucrats to

139. BENJAMIN &
140. Id.
141. Id. at 34.
142. Id.

143. Id. at xvii.

YAGER,

supra note 5, at 33.
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decide which exporting firms can export and how much they can export
to the United States."" When numbers instead of rules guide trade, a
state must increase regulation to produce the politically set market
shares. In turn, this fact encourages firms to collude or create cartels
where before there were none. In Japan, cartel formation only strengthens the iron triangle of Japanese politics."1 5
Second. In pursuing managed trade policies, the United States
uses its political power rather than its economic competitiveness to succeed in the global marketplace. Such behavior is "inconsistent with the
very principals on which the [United States] has itself provided leadership in shaping the world trading system over half a century."1 4 Such
behavior "amounts to a denial of free business activities and of the
system of free trade" "1 7 and is a move away from existing fairness
rules. ' " This behavior also encourages others to behave in the same
manner - beggar thy neighbor - and therefore places the world trading system at risk." 9 Overall, the use of political power moves trade
away from a rule-based system to one resembling the anarchic international system of power politics. 50
Third. Understandably managed trade requires attention by governments to details that are not easily resolved. How does a government count the goods produced by joint companies? What percentage
of the product defines its origin? Are domestically produced but foreign
owned goods foreign or domestic? How does the government guarantee
the percentage of a market? Does it buy the goods and then force its
people to buy them? For how long does the government guarantee access? What is a fair amount of access? From these questions one can
tell that managed trade policies "grossly exaggerate [tihe ability of
governments to control the outcome of complex economic forces."' 5'

144. In the case of autos from Japan, Honda, a firm with no government involvement before the agreement, was forced to politicize its management.
145. See Heizo Takenaka, Japan's International Agenda: Structural Adjustments, in JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 164, supra note 11. Three groups, labeled
collectively as the iron triangle, dominate politics in Japan: politicized business sectors,
their representatives in the Diet, and the bureaucrats who oversee industry. "These
groups seek to maintain a symmetry of power and to protect their vested interests." Id.
at 182.
146. Jagdish Bhagwati, Samurais No More, 73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 7, 7-8 (1994).
147. Kuroda, supra note 9, at 127.
148. BENJAMIN & YAGER, supra note 5, at xvii.
149. See BHAGWATI 1991B, supra note 23.

150. It is arguable that the "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies of the 1930s symbolized such a trade environment.
151. CARNEGIE, supra note 113, at 31.
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Therefore enforcement of managed trade agreements is problematic. In
addition, there is no "sufficiently unambiguous and plausible way" in
which a fair share for the United States in Japan's market can be
calculated. 15
Fourth. Managed trade is likely to be captured politically. It is a
"Pandora's box" which causes every exporting company to call for the
application of targets in their sector, and "given the realities of the
[U.S.] political process, [these pleas are] difficult to resist."1 In such
an environment, U.S. policy cannot set priorities; it just responds to the
wheel that squeaks the loudest. 54 Each problem appears to be handled
on a case-by-case basis in response to the level of political clout of the
complaining industries or firms. Such an approach to trade policy is
costly, inefficient, and never-ending. 15 5 Furthermore, such an approach
cannot be expected to change the fundamentals of the economic relationship, and there is no reason to believe that resolving today's problem will prevent another issue from being raised tomorrow. In fact, the
opposite is true, since handling a complaint today makes it likely that
another issue will be brought forward tomorrow.1 56
Fifth. Pursuing managed trade damages the U.S.-Japan relationship. U.S.-Japan trade negotiations, like the ones begun under the auspices of the 1993 Framework Agreement, continually stall on the issue
of numeric targets. The United States indicates that it wants some type
of numeric target or market share and Japan refuses. Also, whereas
Japan would like the talks to be reciprocal, the United States insists
that they are not, and it stresses its right to use Section 301 sanctions
with respect to any negotiations. This is inflammatory to the Japanese
and only emboldens their opposition to U.S. demands, whatever they
are and whatever they become. After all, Japan is a global economic
superpower that can effectively defend its interests. It "no longer needs
to defer to the dictates of the United States.' 57 Its cooperation "must
now be sought and won . . . on most key issues.' 58 The United States
should recognize this reality and change its approach. As it stands now,
however, the best that can result from the U.S. insistence on managed
trade and the use of Section 301 and the Japanese refusal to use nu-

152.

BHAGWATI 1991A, supra note 5, at 68.
153. CARNEGIE, supra note 113, at 29.
154. BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 202.
155. See Penny Turner, The Feasibility of a U.S.-Japan Free Trade Agreement,
26 Tax. INT'L L. J. 275-313 (1991).
156. BENJAMIN & YAGER, supra note 5, at xvii.
157. Id. at 299.
158. BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 235.
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merical targets is "a continuation of the contentious discussions" which
can only lead to an overall deterioration in U.S.-Japan relations.1 59
4.4

The Auto and Auto Parts Dispute

A very recent example, the auto and auto parts discussions (arguments), shows how deleterious this fundamental disagreement over the
approach could be. These talks began in July 1993 under the Framework Agreement, and three months later then-U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor launched an investigation of Japan for possible
trade barrier violations under Section 301. The talks were generally
cantankerous. The U.S. position, as stated by USTR Kantor, was "it's
time that Japan plays by the same rules the rest of us do." 160 Japan's
position was that it would not accept another managed trade deal like
the 1986 Semiconductor Agreement; it got burned then, and it did not
want to repeat the same mistake.
The United States had three complaints. The main point was the
auto-parts market. The United States argued that the Japanese autoparts market was effectively closed because of Japan's "genuine parts"
certification rules. These rules caused garages to buy parts from certified Japanese auto-dealers, who in turn are tied exclusively to the Japanese auto-makers through age-old contractual relationships. There was
truth in the U.S. argument; this process did bias the auto-parts market
in favor of local producers. This practice, however, did not break any
established rules on trade. But if it was an impediment, then the
United States should have tried to negotiate its removal without political posturing, or it should have taken whatever legal case it might have
had to the WTO; it should not have threatened sanctions like a bully.
Unlike the first complaint, the others were no less than ridiculous.
The second U.S. complaint was that Japan's auto-makers buy too
many parts under long-standing arrangements with Japanese suppliers.
Japanese auto-makers typically find sources through their existing supplier networks - this was and still is true - and the structure of their
contractual relationship is such that assemblers will only change suppliers in response to large cost differences. There is nothing wrong with
this practice. These same types of arrangements would not be illegal
under U.S. anti-trust laws.16 Furthermore, this practice makes sense,
since it alleviates uncertainty, and U.S. auto-makers have begun to imi-

159. BENJAMIN & YAGER, supra note 5, at 40.
160. Interview with Mickey Kantor, former United States Trade Representative,
on This Week with David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, May 28, 1995).
161. Putting a Stop to Trade, THE ECONOMIST, May 27, 1995, at 18.
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tate it.
The last U.S. complaint was that Japan bought too few cars from
the United States. The United States argued that the Japanese automakers' intimate relationships with suppliers and dealers closed Japan
to competition. Meanwhile, somewhat hypocritically, the U.S. automakers clung (and still cling) to the status quo in Europe, where regulations permit auto-makers to operate vast, exclusive dealership networks virtually free of competition.16 2 Even if this intimate relationship
did not exist, however, the Big Three will not sell many U.S.-made cars
unless they put the steering wheel on the right side. Currently, there
are only two U.S.-made cars offered in Japan with right-hand drive
(the norm in Japan) - Chrysler's Jeep Cherokee and Ford's Mazdabased Probe. 1 3 General Motors does not sell even one U.S.-made car in
Japan with right-hand drive. No wonder the Big Three only have a
0.5 % share of the Japanese auto-market. "It's not easy driving a car
16 4
with the steering wheel on the 'wrong' side.
The Big Three's failure contrasts with European automakers' success in Japan. The success of Adam Opel AG,'16 5 Bayerische Motoren
Werke AG and Volkswagen AG show the realities of operating in Japan: though very expensive to enter, the Japanese car market can be
cracked by those who make a genuine commitment to do so. In fact,
BMW and VW have successfully courted Japanese dealerships to sell
their cars, which undermines the argument that Japanese dealers are
closed to foreign cars. 166
The United States cannot expect Japanese consumers to buy U.S.
cars when the Big Three have made almost no effort to sell them, and
it makes little sense for the United States to complain, and almost impose sanctions, over this issue or any of the others. Indeed, it is not
unreasonable to argue that the "only reason Japan is an issue is because the Big Three want [domestic protection]. They're not serious
about building cars for the Japanese market. If they were, you would
see them building in Japan just like they do in Europe.' 6 7 Incidentally,

162. Big Three Tactics Diverge in Japan and Europe, THE WALL ST. J., May 19,

1995, at A2, C3.
163. Interview with Peter Brown, Reporter for AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, on Talk of

the Nation (National Public Radio broadcast, May 11, 1995); Dear Mickey, THE
ECONOMIST, June 17, 1995, at 73.

164. Dear Mickey, supra note 163, at 73.
165. Adam Opel AG is a European auto-maker owned by GM.
166. See Valerie Reitman, Sales of Auto Imports Are Rising in Japan, THE
WALL ST. J., May 19, 1995, at A2.

167. Walter Huizenga, President of the American International Auto Dealers Association, quoted in Reitman, supra note 166.
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the U.S. has never even considered threatening sanctions over another

apparently closed market, that of Great Britain's -

another country

where people drive on the left side of the road. The Big Three's share
of that market is only 0.6%."68
There lies the real point. Japan has a comparative advantage in
auto-production superior to that of the United States. Japanese autos
are reliable, fuel-efficient, and attractive - something U.S.-made cars
only recently have become. As The Economist points out, "[o]ut of the
59 different models on sale in [the United States] . . . every single one
has a steering wheel where Americans expect it."'1 69 Clearly, until
Americans (none of whom have ever been forced to buy a Japanese

car) stop buying so many cars, or until Japanese auto-makers move
most of their production facilities to places like Australia, East Asia,

and South America, the U.S. trade deficit, the majority of which is
from autos and auto parts, will remain high. The trade deal which the
United States and Japan recently reached will not change this basic
fact.
4.4.1

Trade War Barely Averted

Despite the inherent problems in the U.S. stance, the trade dispute
"came closer to outright economic warfare than its predecessors. 1 70 In
May, after negotiations broke down over the issue of numerical targets,
USTR Kantor announced the U.S. plan to impose sanctions 1 71 on thir-

168. See Big Three Tactics, supra note 162.
169. Id.
170. Helene Cooper and Valerie Reitman, Averting a Trade War: U.S. and Japan
Reach Agreement on Autos, THE WALL ST. J., June 29, 1995, at A6.
171. For its part, the United States stated that after it levied sanctions it would
also file a complaint against Japan with the WTO. The proposed use of Section 301
sanctions while making an appeal seems inconsistent and contradictory, however.
Had the [United States] moved resolutely and early to gather facts, file a case
and see it through, it would have demonstrated to the U.S. public and other
nations that trade disputes can be settled by reason. Applying sanctions after
a victory is considered lawful activity; applying sanctions first is considered
bullying.
Bob Davis, U.S.-Japan "Trade War" Is Really Just a Brawl, THE WALL ST. J., May
15, 1995, at Al. This is the course of action the United States should have taken if it
had a legitimate case. Instead, even though there was no compelling national interest to
do so, the United States planned to violate the new dispute settlement rules without
ever giving them a chance to serve their purpose. And even if it did file its supposedly
"massive" case against Japan (probably under the Article 23 "nullification and impairment" provision), observers noted that it did not plan to see the case through; "rather,
filing [was] a tactical move to deflect attention from unilateral [U.S.] sanctions against
the Japanese." Id.
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teen Japanese luxury cars worth $5.9 billion. 171 In response, Japan's
top negotiator said that Kantor "is scarier than my wife when I come
17
home drunk. Both sides painted themselves into a corner through the use of titfor-tat strategies; the United States would not back away from its demands, while Japan stated that it would not offer any new "voluntary
plans" for increasing purchases of U.S. auto parts beyond what Japanese car makers had already detailed.1 7 The sanctions deadline of
12:00 a.m., June 29, 1995,117 was literally a few hours away when the
two sides finally agreed to cease their quarreling.
Box 1: The 1995 Auto-Trade Pact
I.

Japanese auto-makers volunteered their business forecasts, and the United

States makes the following projections:
*
Japanese vehicle production in the United States will increase 25%
*
US-based Japanese auto-makers will purchase $6.75 billion more parts from US
firms by 1998.
Japanese-based car makers will purchase $2 billion more parts US firms.
Japan does not guarantee these results.
2o

Japan will send a letter to Japanese dealers confirming their right to sell foreign cars.
The US auto-makers estimate they will contract more than 200 more Japanese
dealers in 1996 and 1,000 by year 2000.
Japfan does not guarantee these results.

3-

Japan will ease "genuine parts" certification requirements by reducing the number of

parts labeled as :critical," which requires them to be handled by designated garages.
Source: THiEWALL STREET JOURNAL, June 29, 1995, A6.

172. Not all involved in the U.S. auto and auto parts industry favored sanctions.
An ITT Automotive spokesman commented frankly that "this is an issue we wish
didn't exist." Robert Simison & Neal Templin, More Sales of Components in Japan
May Generate Few Jobs in America, THE WALL ST. J., May 18, 1995, at A2. The
reason for ITT's opposition, as well as the opposition of others like Dana Corporation,
was that they have been aggressively expanding into Asia and already have a substantial degree of business in Japan. A trade war would have benefited neither of these
companies, for it would likely result in a backlash and taint the relationships they have
been working so hard to gain and solidify.
173. Hashimoto, quoted in Simison & Templin, supra note 172, at A6.
174. U.S.-Japan to Resume Trade Talks on Market for Automobiles, Auto
Parts, BNA INTERNATIONAL TRADE DAILY, March 24, 1995.
175. After the deadline's announcement, top Japanese trade official Hashimoto
called that "a made-in-the-U.S. deadline." Quoted in Valerie Reitman, Silent Negotiators, THE WALL ST. J., June 27, 1995, at A12. Meanwhile, the Big Three issued
jubilant statements because they could regain lost ground in the luxury car market.
However, it would more likely have been a big pay day for the European luxury automakers. Another outcome would have been certain as well. History shows that whenever new restrictions are imposed on a market, prices for the goods in that market go
up. U.S. consumers would have had to pay more for a luxury car.
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The United States held firm on needing quantifiable targets of production and of a rise in the number of foreign-car dealers in Japan, but
the United States put forward the projections itself and the Japanese
did not commit to them. Evidently, this was enough for both sides to
176
claim victory and a deal was signed.
4.4.2.

What Did the Auto-Trade Pact Achieve?

What did the deal really achieve? The answer is very little. Japanese auto-makers have been considering increasing production in the
United States for quite some time due to the continued rise of the yen.
Their announced moves probably do not differ much from what they
have been considering all along. The U.S.-based Japanese auto-makers
forecasted in early 1995 increased purchases of U.S. auto parts. It is
unclear that they have made concessions to the United States by increasing the size of their forecasted purchase plans. Furthermore, Japan does not in any way guarantee that Japanese auto-makers will
meet their forecasts.
The significant portion of the agreement is the progress on Japan's
"genuine parts" certification practices. This will help liberalize that industry. But the Japanese have shown a willingness to compromise on
7
this issue all along.1

The United States could have achieved the same outcome, and
probably an even better outcome, by focusing on the "genuine parts"
issue all along without the threat of sanctions and the rhetoric of a
U.S. Marshall coming to clean-up Dodge City. This approach, after all,
was and will remain Japan's main point of contention. They refuse to
manage trade. To be sure they may have conceded somewhat on this
point by allowing Japanese auto-makers to volunteer their business
forecasts, but Japanese bureaucrats set forth no numbers. The numbers
used are merely U.S. estimates of what they expect Japanese firms will
do, and these numbers are not guaranteed by Japan. Clearly, on this

176. See Simison & Templin, supra note 172. The deal that aborted the planned

trade war owes less to the U.S. or Japanese trade negotiators than to two American
businessmen, Walter Huizenga and Kjell Bergh. On their own accord, these men used
back-channel connections to arrange meetings with Honda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and
Toyota representatives. They got beyond the rhetoric and almost single-handily
brokered a deal. However, the distrust between Japanese and U.S. officials nearly ruined their efforts. The two sides were agreed on the basic issue but polarized on how to
convert this understanding into a trade agreement. Id.
177. See Bob Davis et al., Getting Serious, THE

WALL ST.

J., May 17, 1995, at
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issue, the Japanese won.""8
In reality, neither the United States nor Japan came out of the
experience as winners. Even if the United States claims victory, the
spoils of that victory in terms of increased exports and jobs do not appear to be very large. With the world's best auto-maker, Toyota, doubling its North American production, along with increases by other Japanese auto-makers, the Japanese will likely take more market share in
the United States, possibly leading to more calls by the Big Three for
protection. This is the unending cycle of managed trade. Meanwhile,
the parts-makers who will benefit the most are those who already, because of serious efforts at penetrating the Japanese market, do significant business in Japan - e.g., Dana Corporation and ITT Automotive.
And their new business will not lead to many more U.S. jobs. Dana
and ITT both stated that they would respond to any new business in
Japan by building more factories there and in East Asia, not in the
United States.' 9
4.4.3.

What Did the U.S. Approach Risk?

Was all this worth a possible trade war? If sanctions were imposed, then Japan might have retaliated; although it has never retaliated against the United States before, there was the increasing possibility that it might do so. It warned in March 1994 that it would retaliate
against any GATT-illegal U.S. actions, 80 and in June 1995 it published a list of possible products which could suffer sanctions. If it did
retaliate, then the bickering over the Big Three auto-maker's access to
the Japanese market would have become a trade war, and the most
likely causalities would have been the WTO, APEC, 18 ' and U.S. economic leadership' 8 2 in the post-Cold War era, not to mention the
thousands of former businesses and employees serving the Japanese
luxury car industry in the United States. In such an event, Japanese
auto-makers could have responded by sourcing even fewer auto parts
from U.S. firms than they currently do. Much worse, "Japanese investors . . . could [have] hurt the [United States] by withdrawing funds

178. One U.S. negotiator conceded, "They won that point." Simison & Templin,
supra note 178, at Al.
179. Davis, supra note 171, at A6.
180. BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 321.
181. Diplomats from East Asian countries say privately that continued use of Section 301, especially Super 301, will undermine APEC and make it harder to launch
serious negotiations for an FTA in the region. Id. at 322.
182. U.S. leadership has probably been undermined despite the trade war not taking place.
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from key U.S. markets."1 8 According to a Christian Science Monitor
Radio report, Japanese investors sold $6.5 billion more assets than they
bought in the United States during 1994, and so far in 1995 have withdrawn $10 billion. This flight would only be exasperated if a trade war
had worsened Japan's banking crisis.
Even if Japan did not retaliate against U.S. imposed sanctions, it
would have taken the issue to the WTO for resolution. The United
States would probably have lost a confrontation in the WTO. Again,
most other states view Section 301 as GATT-illegal, and the East
Asian states are exceptionally hostile to its use because they view themselves as its targets. And although the E.U. privately rode the fence on
the issue of U.S. aggressive unilateralism with Japan because they realized that they could piggy-back on any "successful" U.S. efforts, they
publicly scolded the United States that the use of sanctions without
WTO approval "is not the way to solve trade disputes." 18 4
A loss for the United States in the WTO would have been potentially catastrophic for its sense of leadership and power and its commitment to the world trade order. Also, it is not unimaginable, given the
difficult vote over ratifying the WTO in the U.S. Congress, Senator
Dole's reservations over the sovereignty infringing nature of the WTO's
DRM, the protectionist stance of Senator Helms (the Chair of the Senate's Committee for Foreign Relations), and the lurking U.S. Presidential race, that such a ruling would have been captured politically in an
argument in favor of U.S. protectionism. In fact, Dole commented on
President Clinton's U.S. policy this way: "It's strong medicine. It's going to have to be strong until we're permitted access to their markets."185 One can just imagine the political jockeying taking place on
who could be "tougher" on trade in the 1996 Presidential primaries.
An even worse case scenario than the United States losing in a
WTO ruling would have been if it refused to comply with the WTO's
ruling. Given the growing conservatism in U.S. politics and the past
U.S. record of compliance with GATT dispute settlement rulings
against it,1 86 it is quite possible that the United States would have re-

183. BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 230.
184. Simison & Templin, supra note 172 at A10. The E.U. also despises Section
301. In fact, because of U.S.-E.U. agricultural disputes, the E.U. is targeted by Section
301 actions the most. BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 57.
185. Simison & Templin, supra note 172 at A10.
186. The U.S. responded negatively to 50% (9 of 18) of the valid complaints
brought against it during the 1980s. In four cases, it refused to take remedial action. In
five cases, it imposed sanctions illegally and would not remove them until the victim
had acceded to U.S. demands. The U.S. also habitually delayed taking remedial action
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acted negatively to a WTO ruling against it. This would surely have
crippled if not destroyed the infant organization the United States had
struggled for so long to create.
To be sure, the U.S. insistence on its right to impose sanctions
unilaterally without WTO approval has already weakened the WTO's
credibility as the governing body of world trade. The new system's success depends on the willingness of powers like the United States to accept, uphold, and enforce its rules and principals. "Going-it-alone turns
the WTO into a joke and invites others to disregard it."' 187 In all, the
U.S. policy of choosing which rules of the WTO to obey and when
encourages others to do the same. And "at a time when Asian powers
are gaining on the [United States] in strength, that's shortsighted." 188
Already the U.S. use of restrictive "dumping rules" is copied abroad.
About this fact Schott says, "[T]he United States is creating monsters." 18' 9 There may come the day when the surging powers of Asia
can collectively treat the United States with such disregard, and then it
will only have itself to blame. This is the broader picture that U.S.
trade policy-makers, by pursuing confrontational managed trade agreements through Section 301 threats, refuse to see.
4.5

Section 301

Flirting with a trade war via Section 301, and especially its Super
301 component, is not the best approach for U.S. trade policy in its
desire to change Japan. Although the immensity and leverage of the
U.S. market makes Section 301 a powerful trade tool, it is at odds with
the rules-based multilateral trade system. Most states argue that it is
GATT-illegal. This matters, for as Bhagwati states:
Prima facie, honoring a treaty commitment is to reaffirm one's
respect for orderly procedures and the rule of law in dealing
with other nation-states . . . . There is also the problem that
means affect ends. Is it not likely that a declared willingness to
break GATT commitments, and even actual breach thereof,
may spread cynicism toward such commitments by others
rather than adherence to them in the future? 190

within the Super 301 deadlines it expected others to meet.
note 10, at 251.
187. See Big Three Tactics, supra note 162, at Al.
188. Id. at A8.
189. Id. (quoting Jeffrey J. Schott).
190. BHAGWATI 1991B, supra note 23, at 55.
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Almost every other member of GATT views Section 301 negatively. Japan characterizes it as the "nuclear weapon" of trade policy."' 1 The reasons for the general distaste for Section 301 are clear:
[Its] detailed procedures are structured as a series of public investigations and decisions which make them appear to be
"trade crimes" trials. . . .Section 301 proceedings . . .are a
totally one-sided affair in which the United States plays both
prosecutor and judge, . . . the defendants are tried in absentia,
and . . . [the U.S.] Congress has ordained certain guilty verdicts in advance, particularly with regard to Japan. 192
Section 301 relies on unilateral interpretations of trade practices, and
implicit within it is the belief that the United States is more correct
and less protectionist in its policies and practices than the targeted
county - e.g., Japan. Consequently, Section 301 marks a significant
departure from the key GATT principal that trade rights are defined
by and available to all GATT members. Overall, its use is a step away
from a rules-based trading system.
There are more beneficial ways to approach trade policy than the
Section 301 tool. A recent study by Lee and Roland-Holst analyzing
the prospective impact of alternative trade polices like the use of Section 301 to open Japan found that the welfare gains to the United
States from bilateral liberalization would be far greater than those obtainable by imposing unilateral sanctions - almost nine times as
large.19 3 Likewise, Bayard and Elliot conducted a thorough study of
Section 301 cases to analyze its effectiveness as a trade tool. They
found that a reasonable estimate of the trade gains from successful
Section 301 cases might be only $4 to $5 billion, or 1% of annual
exports, whereas the liberalization from the Uruguay agreements is an
estimated $30 to $40 billion, or 8% to 10% of annual U.S. exports.194
With this finding in mind, Bayard and Elliot state, "Given its relatively
modest impact on U.S. exports, it would be a Pyrrhic victory if Section
301 and other U.S. trade threats undermined the global trading system
that has contributed so importantly to global welfare since 19 4 7 ."195

191. Michael Mastanduno, Setting Market Access Priorities: The Use of Super
301 in U.S. Trade With Japan, 14 THE WORLD ECONOMY 729, 730 (1992).

THE

192. Robert E. Hudec, quoted in Low, supra note 24, at 94.
193. See BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94 at 96-97.
194. BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 57, 334; see also JEFFREY J. ScHorr,
URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994).
195. BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 334.
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In their study, Bayard and Elliot find that U.S. pressure through
Section 301 works best when: (1) there is a vulnerable target; (2) the
barriers negotiated are transparent; (3) its use is GATT-consistent; and
(4) a politically effective constituency in the target country also favors
liberalization."' 6 This was not the case in the auto-trade dispute.
Bayard and Elliot specifically criticize the use of Super 301.1"
Super 301 requires the U.S. Trade Representative to identify certain
individual countries and practices as trade liberalizing priorities. " ' After the liberalizing priorities are established, the United States threatens to impose retaliatory sanctions if the trade practice deemed as unreasonable is not removed within the mandated time frame. 199 On the
whole, Bayard and Elliot find that Super 301 is "unnecessarily inflammatory . . . and potentially counterproductive. 20 0 U.S. trading partners associate it with the worse excesses of aggressive unilateralism that is, the labeling of target countries as unfair traders (even though
their practices do not violate existing international trade agreements).
Thus, it further erodes U.S. leadership and credibility in any future
trade negotiations. Also, while fear of retaliation may "squeeze out
marginal concessions," even vulnerable states will only engage in substantial liberalization when they believe it is in their interests to do
SO. 9 201

Bayard and Elliot add that "while systemic and structural barri-

ers are a legitimate problem for U.S. exporters in some cases, . . . la20 2
beling [these countries] as unfair traders is not an effective solution.

196. Id. at 320.
197. See id. at 55, 76, 313, 317.

198. Super 301 initially singled out three nations, but observers believe that the
United States named India and Brazil alongside Japan only to prevent from isolating
the latter. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI & HUGH T. PATRICK, AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1990). In
fact, Senator John Danforth stated that "while Super 301 was designed to be aimed at
more than Japan, it was not aimed at anything less than Japan." Quoted in Senate
Committee on Finance, Oversight of the Trade Act of 1988, 100th Congress, 1st Sess.
14 (Comm. Print 1989). Super 301 originally authorized the USTR to pinpoint trade
liberalizing priorities only for the years 1989 and 1990, but President Clinton renewed
its authority by executive order on March 3, 1994. Exec. Order No. 12,901, 3 C.F.R.
10721(1994).
199. In addition to viewing Section 301 as a tool in forcing unilateral concessions,
the United States considered it as a bargaining tool for the then-current Uruguay
Round negotiations of GATT. Interview with Frank Garcia, Assistant Professor of International Business & Trade Law, Florida State University, in Tallahassee, Fla. (May
1, 1995).
200. BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 313.
201. Id.at 316.
202. Id.at 321.
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Overall, Bayard and Elliot find that the use of "Super 301 is undesirable because the potentially significant - and unnecessary - costs
outweigh the limited benefits."2 0
What policy is desirable then? In concluding their study, Bayard
and Elliot observe that the work for U.S. trade policy which remains
after the Uruguay Round involves ill-defined, non-tariff barriers which
are less amenable to a process like Section 301. They state, "The more
systemic the barrier, the greater will be the number of groups that
must cooperate in eliminating it."20 4 They point out that "broad based
changes in the mental attitudes of low-level bureaucrats, consumers,
and the society at large are needed as a part of an effective solution to
structural problems." They explain that trade agreements - like the
1995 Auto-Trade Pact, one might suggest - which "are not accompanied by a corresponding change in mentality are meaningless." 2 0 They
go on to say that ameliorating the differences between Japan and the
United States requires "a profound understanding of the reasons for
the differences, how they impede trade, and how they can be changed
without undermining legitimate economic objectives or social preferences."2 06 The next section outlines such a broad-based, cooperative,
and fundamentally different approach, built around a Japan-U.S. FTA,
that would lead to such a new mentality and understanding in the Japan-U.S. relationship.
Section 5: Improving The U.S.-Japan Relationship: A Japan-U.S.
FTA
The Cold War partnership between our countries is outdated.
We need a new partnership based on a longer vision and above
all based on mutual respect and responsibility.
-

President Clinton to Prime Minister Miyazawa, 16 April 1993207
What issues and challenges will dominate the next century are
unclear, but two things are certain: economics will be at the
center of international affairs, and the [U.S.]-Japan partnership
will play a key role in determining the course of global events.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

317.
336.
316.
342.

Quoted in

CARNEGIE,

supra note 113, at 1.
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The Clinton Administration is committed to charting a new
course of relations with Japan that builds on these emerging
realities.
-

Former Secretary of the Treasury Roger C. Altman'"8

If we keep our objectives in mind, we will realize that the way
in which we have tried to relieve the frictions has often been in
conflict with what should be our goal.
-

Economist Robert Z. Lawrence0 9

Given that economic competition will, and should, continue between the two countries, we need to cease this nickel-and-diming approach that we have fallen into and find a more collaborative, broader and longer range method of resolving our
individual trade differences. . . . One idea worth looking at is
the concept of a free trade agreement between the [United
States] and Japan.
-

Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield1 0

There exist many clich6s about the U.S.-Japan relationship, but
most everyone recognizes as truth the mantra that it is the most important bilateral trade relationship in the world."' Why, then, is better
care not taken of it? No one can sufficiently answer this question. For
this reason, almost every study of the relationship calls for a new collaboration. They argue that the United States and Japan need to formulate practical ways to address jointly the current problems, like the
North Korea nuclear issue, and future ones, like the emergence of
China as a superpower. Studies argue that the United States and Japan
need to address their trade problems jointly in a less charged atmosphere. Although President Clinton has professed the need for such a
"partnership," his administration's actions move U.S. policy in the opposite direction. It is time to stop this negative trend.
The U.S.-Japan relationship must be viewed with an eye toward
its broader context. It is a vital relationship not only in economic terms,
but also in political and strategic terms, and the costs would be enor-

208.
209.
210.
211.

Quoted in Schott, supra note 16, at 6.
Robert Z. Lawrence, comment to Kuroda, supra note 9, at 131.
Quoted in Kuroda, supra note 9, at 122.
Abramowitz, supra note 116, at xvii.
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mous if the two states were to go separate ways. Such a possibility is
not far from the minds of many Japanese, especially with their newfound economic superpower status. According to Kuroda, "there is a
growing mood that [Japan] should take a path of separation and go it
alone. 12 12 This gives all the more reason for the United States to move
in a fundamentally different and more conciliatory direction. To do
that this study recommends that the United States abandon the use of
Section 301 and pursue a non-traditional FTA with Japan (JUSFTA)
which includes a consultative mechanism, a dispute resolution mechanism, and a macroeconomic coordination mechanism in the form of a
G2.

2 13

5.1

JUSFTA

To resolve its disputes, the United States needs to restructure its
relationship with Japan substantially. It needs to examine the underlying problems as a whole rather than responding to individual problems
piecemeal, for the ad hoc managed trade approach only treats symptoms rather than causes. Overall, it needs a substantially better forum
for the seemingly endless arguments and counter-arguments over product-specific and industry-specific disputes which have not improved but
worsened U.S.-Japan relations. Without such a forum, the United
States and Japan will neither mitigate trade tensions nor correct trade
imbalances. Such a forum could be found in a U.S.-Japan FTA.
A JUSFTA is not a new idea. In 1987 former ambassador to Ja-

212. Makoto Kuroda quoted in MITI-Appointed Private Study Group Warns
U.S.-Japan FTA Would Harm Multilateralism, BNA INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER,

June 21, 1989.

213. This G2 could be expanded to include the core European Union states once
monetary union occurs amongst them. On another note, the United States should also
pursue an expanded role for Japan in international affairs. Quite legitimately, observers
characterize Japan as a "free rider" in security, economic, and political arrangements.
BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 201. Much of Japan's lack of responsibility
stems from its lack of offensively capable armed forces and East Asia's fear of any
Japanese moves to substantially rearm itself; from its political system needing gaiatsu
to act on major international and domestic issues; and from its Cold War big brotherlittle brother relationship with the United States. The big brother-little brother mentality, however, is outdated and understandably sparks Japanese resentment. CARNEGIE,
supra note 113, at 4. This is all the more reason for the United States to make Japan a
full partner in the international system. A vital step would be to bring Japan into the
United Nation's Security Council. Even if it did this, however, (and geo-politics weigh
very much against this occurrence) some argue that "Japan cannot develop an effective
international role until there is a significant measure of domestic political change."
Funabashi, supra note 11, at 25.
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pan Mike Mansfield stated that "an FTA could be helpful in defining
the economic goals of [the U.S.-Japan] relationship. It is better to face
up to the whole policy issue rather than submit to nickel and diming on
every single issue."' 214 In January 1988 Professor Milton Friedman and
ten other economists placed a full page ad in the Washington Post urging the United States and Japan to establish an FTA as a means of
easing trade disputes. In the same year then Secretary of Commerce C.
William Verity stated that "an honest and two-way examination of the
issues of free trade would underline both for [the United States] and
Japan the responsibilities [they] bear to each other."2 1 In 1989 Schott
wrote that "an FTA could contribute to the improved management of
bilateral trade relations by creating new rights and obligations that
perforce require new consultative and dispute resolution mechanisms to
supervise the operation of the agreements and enforce the parties'
rights and obligations. 2 16 In 1990 Peters stated that "the ability of a
[U.S.]-Japan FTA to remedy the numerous problems in the trade relationship is significant . . .and its potential scope can be assessed only
through the commencement of serious preliminary negotiations."2"'
And in 1991 Turner argued that "an FTA with Japan would . . . force
the two nations to take a closer look at the macroeconomic factors...
which [are] the primary cause of the current trade imbalance."218
Overall, these observers agree that an FTA is an efficient avenue for
pursuing a new comprehensive collaboration.
There are a number of notable precursors to a JUSFTA. Recent
examples include the Market-Oriented Sector Specific (MOSS) talks,
the Structural Impediments Initiative (SI) talks, and the 1993 Framework Agreement. 219 These mechanisms, however, have only been halfway approaches to the problem. They have not been comprehensive
enough nor have they been truly reciprocal. They all have started with
the assumption that Japan's markets, as symbolized by Japan's low
propensity to import, are closed; that Japan is to blame for the U.S.
trade deficit; and that therefore Japan must change. 2 '

214. See Schott, supra note 16 at 32.
215. C. William Verity, Remarks Before the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Dept. of Commerce News, June 8, 1988.
216. Schott, supra note 16, at 52.
217. Mary Peters, Free Trade Area Agreements as the Economic and Legal Solution to Bilateral Trade Relationships: The Case of Japan, 28 COLUM. J. OF TRANS-

L. 499, 529-30 (1990).
218. See BENJAMIN & YAGER, supra note 5, at 296.
219. See Schott, supra note 16 for a fuller discussion.
220. Although the SI talks had a more reciprocal tone, the United States did not
enact any of the recommendations given by Japan.
NAT'L
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An FTA would involve a fundamentally different approach than
these precursors. Unlike negotiations characterized by Section 301 proceedings, these negotiations would necessarily be more consultative, not
dictatorial, with both sides open to critical concessions. 2 Also, Schott
makes clear that by entering into FTA negotiations the United States
and Japan would establish
a stake in [the FTA's] success, since once the negotiating process begins, it is hard to go back to the status quo ante. Expectations get built into the process, and if results are not achieved,
there is a risk that the backlash could worsen relations. Thus,
by focusing attention on the overall bilateral relationship, the
successful conclusion of an FTA takes on importance for many
22
reasons beyond the economic ones. 1
Such a concentration of attention and political stake will help the
United States and Japan realize their much talked about global partnership. In addition, the FTA approach, as opposed to precedents like
the SII talks, would result in a binding agreement. Overall, the negotiation of an FTA with Japan would force the United States to prioritize
its trade concerns. The United States would have to identify systematically government policies and private practices which are barriers. It
could then push for true market liberalization in Japan. It is this true
liberalization which "provides the greatest trade benefits in almost all
cases of impeded market access. . . .The payoffs . . . are likely to be
much greater than any 'managed trade' deal."2 23
5.1.1

Japan's Motivation in Negotiating a JUSFTA

Accepting the arguments above, why might Japan negotiate an
FTA with the United States? There are four prime reasons.
ONE. Japan may wish to avoid any trade diversion that might take
place if the United States begins to form a WHFTA. Japan has been
particularly vocal in expressing concern that NAFTA is protectionist
and trade diverting. In 1993 Former Prime Minister Miyazawa even

221. Let there be no illusions; the United States would have to make concessions
of its own. The largest concession it could make would be a standstill commitment on
U.S. barriers; it could also agree to eliminate the 25% tariff on small trucks, which,
ridiculously enough, came into existence as a result of a trade war with Europe over
chickens. Its other obvious barriers, which come mostly through managed trade agreements already negotiated, could be phased out over time.
222. Schott, supra note 16, at 11.
223. BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 197.
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imagined that NAFTA could turn America into a "fortress" against
foreign goods.22 4 Since Japan is heavily involved in Chile's economy,
such concern will surely be voiced louder if Chile accedes to the
NAFTA.22 5
Two. Japan may wish to keep trade issues from hurting the U.S.Japan security relationship. Its relationship with the United States remains the key to its stability and psychological sense of security. 26 It
very much needs the U.S. presence in East Asia to safeguard the region's security and continued prosperity. 2 Clearly, if its trade relationship with the United States deteriorates to the point that the United
States no longer wishes to guarantee its protection, then it would have
to rebuild its armed forces substantially, and currently no state in East
Asia welcomes this. 28
THREE. Japan may wish to have insurance against future U.S. protectionism. The first and largest concession it would likely seek from
the United States would be a standstill commitment on U.S. barriers.
Also, Japan may view an FTA as the only means in which it may ever
get the United States to agree to phase out the existing managed trade
agreements. Lastly, after an FTA was formed, Japan would no longer
have to worry about the threat of Section 301 sanctions; its place in the
U.S. economy would be secure.
FOUR. Japan may view an FTA as a politically viable way to instill domestic reforms like deregulation. 2 9 Japan has a heavily regu-

224. Richard Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion
Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J. OF INT'L L. 315,

318 (1993). This phrase comes from observers who have characterized the European
Union as creating a "fortress" Europe.
225. As mentioned earlier, NAFTA accession to include Chile looked almost certain at the time of this writing.
226. CARNEGIE, supra note 113, at 7.
227. Id.
228. See MASON & TURAY, supra note 2; FUKUYAMA & OH, supra note 118.
229. An excellent example of Japan's over-regulation is cellular phones, an industry pioneered in Japan but then regulated so heavily that the United States and Europe
soon dominated. According to THE WALL ST. J.:
a year ago the government finally permitted people to buy cellular phones
instead of just renting them. Phone prices have dropped by more than half,
and even to zero, as companies woo subscribers with cut-rate sets. . . Sales
are exploding. From last April through this January, consumers snapped up
1.6 million cellular phones, almost four times the number of new rentals the
entire previous year.
David P. Hamilton, et al., Tied in Knots Japan's Big Problem: Freeing its Economy
from Over-Regulation, THE WALL ST. J., April 25, 1995, at Al.
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lated economy. 30° This fact reflects the strength of the iron triangle in
Japanese politics. Bureaucrats simply want to protect the Japanese industries which support them. Consequently, Japan's regulation and tax
laws hinder its imports and suppress its consumption, and its cartels
force high prices. Economists in Japan recognize that change needs to
come, however.2 31 They find that Japan's real income could increase by
20 % to 40 % if domestic prices dropped to international levels. 32 To be
sure, due to its sluggish growth23 3 and high yen over the past few years,
changes like deregulation have begun to occur.2 3' But Japan's efforts
have been largely piecemeal, and in general it has not shown the political will to trim down its bureaucratic regulation - despite its citizens
wishes and despite the wealth deregulation could bring." 5 In this context, the Japanese consumers welcome gaiatsu like the SII talks. 2 6
Such forums help "buttress the shortcomings of patterned pluralism, '' 3 and they are desirable as more permanent institutions dealing
with trade disputes.23 8 For Japan, such an institution may be a
JUSFTA.
5.1.2

The United States' Motivation in Negotiating a JUSFTA

Why might the United States want to negotiate an FTA with Japan? There are four prime reasons.
ONE. The United States may wish to avoid an economic Cold
War. The U.S.-Japan relationship is in trouble. Although the two countries just avoided a trade war over autos and auto parts, more and more
firms in the United States are pressuring the USTR's office for action

230. "Although the economy is highly advanced, it is still run, in many ways, like
a developing one." Id. at A13.
231. See Takenaka, supra note 145; see also Kazumasa Iwata, Rule Maker of
World Trade: Japan's Trade Strategy and the World Trading System, in JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 111, supra note 11.
232. Takenaka, supra note 145, at 168.
233. Japan's growth over the last few years has been below 1 %, and in 1994 it

was negative. Hamilton, supra note 229, at A13.
234. One MITI official states, "We must deregulate or die." Quoted in id. at A13.
235. See id.

236. Takenaka reports that "demands [which] were asserted in the SII context
found wide support among Japanese citizens due to their recognition that external pressure offers an effective means for surmounting patterned pluralism." See supra note
145, at 183.

237. Id. Patterned pluralism in this context means that market mechanisms function in some but not other sectors. Also, managed trade has the opposite effect because
of its demand for preferential treatment.
238. See Iwata, supra note 231
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on their behalf, and, as of this writing, the USTR is currently considering sanctions over Federal Express's access to Japanese airports and
over Kodak's claims that Fuji competes unfairly in the Japanese film
market. However valid these cases might be - and it should be added
that even though their cases appear to be on surer ground than the Big
Three auto-maker's complaints, their validity has yet to be fully accepted by academics or the media - they show how ubiquitous are the
problems in the U.S.-Japan relationship. The case of Kodak highlights
Benjamin's and Young's hypothesis that whenever an industry experiences a trend of deficits with Japan they will appeal to the USTR for
action.
What will happen if the USTR does file a Section 301 suit? It is
doubtful that the next U.S. threat will be tempered before sanctions go
into effect. Clyde Prestowitz, President of the Economic Strategy Institute, stated prior to the last deal that "if there is maybe one more
'standard' deal, it will be the last one."2 9 Japan has grown more adamant about not acquiescing to U.S. demands. If its current trend of
refusing continues on the path that observers like Prestowitz believe it
will, then Japan will refuse to change its policies, and President Clinton
and the USTR, instead of losing face by backing down, may decide to
continue the contest and "drop the bomb on them. 2 4 A full-blown
economic war could follow. Therefore if the U.S. wants to prevent another "Big Scare" from developing into a "Big Bang," then it might
want to take an approach like the JUSFTA outlined later in this
section.
Two. The United Sates, like Japan, may wish to keep trade issues
from hurting the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Again, the U.S. security relationship with Japan has been "the foundation of East Asia's
stability and prosperity."'2 41 Pentagon officials, like the Assistant Secretary for International Security Joseph Nye, recognize that "[this relationship's] fraying, as the 50th anniversary this summer of the bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should remind both parties, could have
perilous consequences. ' 1242 Indeed, a report labeled as the "Nye Initiative" underlines the need for cooperation if the United States is to handle the danger of a nuclear-armed North Korea and a recalcitrant
China. 43 Such cooperation will not take place if, through a trade war,

239. Quoted in Church, supra note 111, at 30.
240. On the telephone with General Motor's CEO John F. Smith Jr., Kantor was
quoted as exclaiming, "We're going to drop the bomb on them!" Id. at 30.
241. Is Japan Normal?, THE ECONOMIST, June 24, 1995, at 25-26.
242. Id. at 25.

243. Id.
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the economic side of the relationship cripples the security side.
THREE. The United States may wish to focus all of its pressure on
Japan in one concentrated approach to its problems within an environment conducive to change. It was mentioned in the last sub-section that
Japanese consumers have the most to gain from Japanese deregulation.
Bayard and Elliot argue that if the United States were to advertise
relentlessly a thoroughly researched, well-constructed case on how Japanese barriers negatively affect the Japanese standard of living, then
Japanese consumers might mobilize to effect change."' These observers
agree that the United States will not solve its trade problems with Japan, problems which are emboldened by the Japanese iron-triangle of
politics, without gaiatsu focused on persuading the Japanese consumer
of the wisdom in the U.S. position. Unfortunately, every new debilitating quarrel over managed trade just encourages the Japanese consumer's belief that the United States is using its muscle to gain special
privileges and not to further the cause of a free market in Japan.24 5
FOUR. The United States may wish to pursue a JUSFTA in order
to promote global free trade. Strategically speaking, if the United
States negotiated the JUSFTA sketched later in this section, it would
eliminate the possibility of the world trading order digressing into one
of three trading blocs. It would have bridged the chasm separating Japan from the similar market structures of Europe and North America.
The dynamic trade effects of such an accomplishment can not be understated; they would likely be tremendous. Also, if the United States
wished to continue a regional trade policy in the Asian-Pacific region, it
would have removed one of its largest stumbling blocks in such a pursuit; without Japanese cooperation, however, an APEC FTA is almost
certainly not going to unfold.
The possibilities appear endless. The United States could incorporate Japan in its WHFTA pursuit. It might even be able to link a
WHFTA and APEC. Even better, having established the means for
cooperation in its most vital trade relationship, it could launch a new
round of multilateral GATT trade negotiations aimed at harmonization
of standards and competition policies and at furthering progress on
trade in services issues. Overall, President Clinton's words regarding
the recent auto trade pact would aptly describe the situation: "This
breakthrough is a major step toward free trade throughout the
world." 4 That's exactly what a JUSFTA would be.

244.
245.
sponding
246.

See BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 10.
Such a concentrated approach could also relieve the USTR's office from reto future calls for managed trade.
Clinton's Phoney Peace, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 13.
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5.1.3

Objectives of a JUSFTA

There would be five objectives for the negotiations of a JUSFTA
to meet:
" Creating a consultative mechanism.
" Facilitating structural changes.
* Creating working groups to promote harmonization of standards
and competition policies, as well as to oversee particular sectors.
* Establishing an effective DRM.
* Establishing a G2 for macroeconomic coordination.
The JUSFTA would be a non-traditional FTA because it would emphasize the consultative mechanism, the DRM, and the G2 but would
not necessarily be geared toward eliminating all traditional barriers to
trade. Although the elimination of all barriers is desirable, the tariffs
between the United States and Japan are already quite low and are
really secondary issues when compared to structural differences.
5.1.4

Consultative Mechanism

A consultative mechanism establishes the proper environment in
which to conduct trade negotiations by creating guidelines and rules. It
can involve establishing working groups which provide an arena for
ongoing studies on harmonization, and it can require regular and frequent meetings to take place between both parties' officials at the cabinet and sub-cabinet levels. Frequent meetings among these persons
would allow for a virtually continuous dialogue on bilateral relations
and the full range of regional and global developments. Such a dialogue is essential to making Japan a true partner.
5.1.4.1

Structural Impediments Talks

Overall, the amelioration of both the U.S. and Japanese external
imbalances can only occur if the United States encourages private
savings and reduces the cost of capital investment - through structural adjustments like reducing its federal budget deficit - and Japan bolsters domestic demand - through structural adjustments like
deregulation. Other positive steps for Japan would be: revamping its
distribution system, enforcing its competition laws, reforming its
product liability and regulatory standards, and changing its land use
policies. Other positive steps for the United States would be: developing its human capital better by reforming and devoting more resources to its educational system, deregulating its banking industry,
and revising its restrictive export policies on high-technology goods.
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5.1.4.2

Working Groups

A JUSFTA should establish several working groups to coordinate
efforts to harmonize regulatory standards. Two groups would be critical. One would work on issues in trade and competition law. The
other would work "to facilitate the process by which the [two countries] make compatible their standards-related measures. 2 47 Other
important groups to establish would be ones working on financial services, telecommunications, defense and civilian technology, agriculture, and auto trade. These groups should include consumer advocates, government representatives, interest groups, and academic
trade law experts. They should work to create the rules by which
Japan and the United States will conduct their relationship. Both
superpowers should agree to implement to the largest extent possible
these groups recommendations. In this sense, they would function
like the independent minded U.S. military base-closing committee.
5.1.5

Dispute Resolution Mechanism

A DRM is vital to helping the U.S.-Japan relationship. More than
any other measure, it would make rules, not politics the determinate of
trade dispute outcomes. It would provide a more efficient, less biased
forum in which the United States and Japan could resolve their trade
disputes. It would also keep trade disputes from becoming politicized.
The DRM should allow private parties in both U.S. and Japanese
courts to bring suit on the basis of the JUSFTA treaty, and it should
have two divisions: a general dispute resolution mechanism and an antidumping/countervailing duty (AD/CVD) DRM. This parallels the
structure of the CUSFTA and NAFTA DRMs. 248
The primary division would be the general DRM. This would establish a Free Trade Commission composed of cabinet-level representatives from both countries. It would resolve disputes involving discrepancies in the interpretation or application of the JUSFTA. Disputes
would first require consultation. If this fails to resolve the issue, then
arbitration panels or expert panels would be the next step. Arbitration
panels would make recommendations on how to solve the dispute while
expert panels would issue binding rulings. Therefore the latter would be
49
the forum for settlement of intractable disputes.1

247. Abott, supra note 20, at 98.
248. Id. at 100-02.
249. See Note, Old Wine, New Skins: NAFTA and the Evolution of international
Trade Dispute Resolutions, 15 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 255 (1993).
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The second division would be the AD/CVD DRM. According to
Rosa, "the importance of an effective AD/CVD dispute resolution system . . . can hardly be overemphasized," for AD/CVD actions are
usually viewed by the recipient as protectionist rather than as a "legitimate exercise of regulatory power." ' 50 The CUSFTA AD/CVD DRM
has resulted in an "increased perception of fairness and impartiality in
administration of unfair trade laws."25' 1 The success of CUSFTA's
DRM suggests that it should be replicated in a JUSFTA.
Overall, the dispute resolution process should be speedy and capable of rendering judgments in less than a year. It should also have the
ability to appoint working groups to iron-out problems which the rules
of the JUSFTA do not address. In this sense, it would be part of the
law-making process and not just the adjudicator of established rules.
Likewise, if the United States and Japan decided to implement the
JUSFTA DRM before any major commitments had been made, the
DRM could be provisional until it had specific commitments to oversee.
In any case, the JUSFTA DRM would move U.S.-Japan disputes away
from the political arena to one dominated by rules.
5.1.6

G2

The time has clearly come to install new systemic arrangements
. . .to avoid future repetitions of [the trade imbalance cycles]
with their extremely damaging economic and political
consequences.2 52
Again, the underlying problems in the trade relationship do not lie
in trade polices and restrictions, but rather in the discordant
macroeconomic environment. Many economists ascribe much of the
growth in the U.S. trade deficit with Japan in the 1980s to an overvalued dollar in relation to the yen. They also cite the high savings and
investment rate in Japan relative to the United States. 253 As such, the
macroeconomic goals in the relationship should be fiscal contraction in
the United States and fiscal expansion in Japan. Also, "a sustained real
exchange rate realignment . . . would have a significant impact on
trade flows." ' 2 5 ' Cline computes that every 1% rise (fall) in the real

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 271.
Id. at 272, n.117 (citation omitted).
BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 203.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 55.
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value of the yen against the dollar eventually produces a decrease (increase) of approximately one billion dollars in the bilateral deficit. " "
Therefore both countries need to pay closer attention to macroeconomic
coordination. They should pursue systemic cooperation in a G2 for
macroeconomic policy coordination. Although accomplishment of this
goal would be even more technically and politically difficult than the
other components of the JUFSTA, an attempt should be made nonetheless. If it were accomplished, then the United States and Japan
would finally be installing the means to manage their bilateral relationship and the world economy as a whole.
CONCLUSION

While this prospect of NAFTA accession and of a WHFTA has
many scholars and policy-makers excited, few have asked or answered
a critical question - is Latin America an ideal free trade partner?
This study shows why it is not.
It made sense for the United States to enter an FTA with Canada
and Mexico because they are significant trading partners. However,
Latin America is not; its volume and pattern of trade with the United
States is small and dissimilar. This means that by integrating with
Latin America the United States can expect to gain little in terms of
economies of scale; it can also expect to divert trade away from a much
more vital trading region for the United States, East Asia. 56 East
Asia, not Latin America, is the region that the United States should
integrate with if it wishes to pursue a regional trade policy. It is the
region with which the U.S. livelihood and sense of well-being are increasingly bound. 5 Why, then, is the United States pursuing a
WHFTA?
The introduction of this study argued that the United States move
toward regionalism is part of a general trend in U.S. protectionism.
When first proposed, the United States wished to protect its industries
from the inexorable competition East Asia masses by gaining preferential market access in Latin America. It also wished to use the idea of a
WHFTA to gain concessions from other trading powers, most notably
Japan.
Japan is a major stumbling bloc for the United States in pursuing
regional integration with East Asia. Clearly, if the United States
255. See William Cline, How Undervalued is the Yen? (Paper available from the
Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC) (1993).
256. See Plummer & Iboshi, supra note 54.

257.

CARNEGIE,

supra note 113, at vii.
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wishes to secure its broad interests in East Asia and form a significant
Asian-Pacific bloc, one with more vigor than APEC, it must resolve its
differences with Japan. The United States should seriously seek such a
rapprochement through a JUSFTA, rather than through Section 301
and managed trade deals which have shown little evidence of helping
U.S. competitiveness and risk far more in terms of lost U.S. credibility
and leadership - not to mention the effects on the world trading system - than they promise to deliver in terms of jobs and wealth. 8
Japan, unlike Latin America, is an ideal free trade partner for the
United States. In fact, the United States has an unprecedented degree
of interdependence with Japan. For this reason, the United States
should view it as a vital friend, not just the nation with which it has its
largest bilateral trade deficit. 5 9 It should view it "as an indispensable
partner in the management of the global economy to which [its] wellbeing is deeply and inextricably tied."26 0 Furthermore, it should view it
as the preeminent economic power in the international system today,
26 1
one whose cooperation "must now be sought and won," not dictated.
Such a dictatorial approach to U.S.-Japan relations is outdated and
only worsens U.S.-Japan relations.
The United States should realize that the means it has employed
to solve U.S.-Japan trade problems has had exactly the opposite effect.
There is little doubt that the U.S.-Japan relationship is more deeply
troubled now than ever before. Each state's peoples are now more than
ever willing to sever the relationship. Such a mood should alarm U.S.
and Japanese decision-makers. The recent trade brawl over autos and
auto parts should also sound an alarm. Although it did not become a
trade war, it easily could have. This near miss should motivate them to
undertake a new approach.
The size and power of the U.S.-Japan relationship indicates that
their current behavior will greatly influence the conduct of international trade for years to come. If their relations continue to deteriorate
to the point of severing, the world trading order could suffer a similar
fate. A new collaborative framework is the only path that will fill the
"trust gap" and allow the two nations to guide the international system
2 62
in a positive direction.
The condition of the U.S.-Japan relationship could be compared to
that of France and Germany after World War II. Both countries need

258.
259.

BENJAMIN
CARNEGIE,

&

YAGER,

supra note 5, at 41.

supra note 113, at 5.

260. Id.
BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 235.
262. For a similar argument see Kuroda, supra note 9.

261.
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each other but have a history of quarreling. As Germany's and
France's age-old bickering exploded into World War I and eventually
led to World War II, the United States' and Japan's bickering has
threatened to begin an economic Cold War. To be sure, the 1995 AutoTrade Pact avoided that catastrophe this time, but it does nothing
about avoiding future problems. A JUSFTA will. The United States
and Japan should not wait to damage each other economically before
they finally decide to institutionalize the means to their cooperation.
A JUSFTA is the solution to U.S.-Japan relations.26 3 It would allow a cooperative forum in which both countries could solve their differences without political posturing. Through a consultative mechanism
- with regular cabinet and sub-cabinet meetings, with binding negotiations pinpointing needed structural changes, and with working groups
studying and overseeing harmonization of standards and competitions
laws - the two countries can solve their differences. Through an effective dispute resolution mechanism, the two countries can limit the effect of any new dispute by using rules and not political judgment to
determine unfair competition. Through a G2 for macroeconomic coordination, the two countries can finally begin to realize the potential of
their relationship.
These types of institutional links with Japan involve some new
thinking about national sovereignty. Those who fret that with such
links foreigners will hold too much influence in determining U.S. domestic affairs ignore the fact that "economic interdependence long ago
destroyed much of the autonomy of most nations." 2"' They should face
reality. The United States is no longer a hegemon and is increasingly
dependent on the outside world. As Bergsten and Noland argue:
it is clearly more constructive to discuss key national differences
openly, with an eye toward reducing them, than to ignore them;
their propensity to trigger real economic problems, and therefore disputes between the [United States and Japan], is too

263. As mentioned above, a JUSFTA would also eliminate the possibility of the
world trade order digressing into a system of three powerful blocs. A bridge between
the United States and the European Union would do the same. However, the U.S.-E.U.
relationship is not in any danger of severance; the U.S.-Japan relationship is, and
therefore it should take priority. Also, a U.S.-E.U. FTA will likely be viewed by Japan
and East Asia as a bloc formed against them, thus encouraging them to form a bloc of
their own. Because of the closeness of the E.U. and the United States, however, it is
doubtful that the E.U. would view a JUSFTA in such manner. Hence, if a E.U.-U.S.
FrA is "in the cards," so to speak, then it should be negotiated only after or simultaneously to JUSFTA negotiations.
264. BERGSTEN & NOLAND, supra note 94, at 212.
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great. [Institutional links] must be a part of any comprehensive
new strategy to deal effectively with U.S.-Japan economic
265
relations.
Furthermore, whereas U.S. influence over Japan currently wanes considerably, the institutional links envisioned in the JUSFTA proposed
here would enshrine U.S. influence, providing it with a far greater
amount of leverage with Japan in the future than it would otherwise
have.
In summary, the United States can no longer dominate the world
economy, nor can it dictate policies to Japan. And in absence of a security blanket like that necessitated by the Cold War, economic conflict will be the norm in world alliance politics. This increased instability and volatility makes cooperation in the U.S.-Japan relationship
more worthwhile than ever before. A JUSFTA, although immense in
terms of time, effort, and difficulty, would necessitate cooperation, resolve disputes, and encourage true long-term liberalization and trust in
the U.S.-Japan relationship. It would also finally begin realizing the
much talked about "global partnership" between the two countries.
Lastly, it would be a giant step toward global free trade, and it would
re-inspire faith in U.S. leadership of the international economic system.
A JUSFTA is exactly what the U.S.-Japan relationship, as well as the
rest of the world, needs.

265. Id.

1996]

IDEAL FREE TRADE PARTNERS

Table 1: US Exports and Imports by Country/Region, 1992 (in S billions)

World
Japan
Latin America'
Chile
Mercosur
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Andean Group
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela
CACM
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua

Exports
447.366
47.764
33.574
2.455
9.608
3.222
5.740
0.415
0.231
10.943
0.222
3.282
0.999
1.002
5.438
4.293
1.348
0.741
1.208
0.808
0.188

Imports
552.599
99.481
33.937
1.627
9.834
1.370
8.145
0.038
0.281
14.129
0.166
3.064
1.482
0.781
8.636
4.056
1.542
0.409
1.182
0.851
0.072

a. Including Panama.,
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, andTrinidad and Tobago also.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1994.

Table 2: Good Customers and Good Providers - Approximate Shares for US Imports and Exports,
1992

Japan
Latin Amerka'
Chile
Mercosur
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Andean Group
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela
CACM
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua

Good Customer
10.677
7.505
0.549
2.148
0.720
1.283
0.093
0.052
2.446
0.050
0.734
0.223
0.224
1.216
0.960
0.301
0.166
0.270
0.181
0.042

a. Including Panama, Dominican Republic, Jamaica. andTrinidad and Tobago also.
Source: Table I

Good Provider
18.002
6.141
0.294
1.780
0.340
1.474
0.007
0.051
2.557
0.030
0.554
0.268
0.141
1.563
0.734
0.280
0.074
0.214
0.154
0.013
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Table 3: Top US Industries for Exports, 1991 (in S millions)
NTDBW
10
27
29
39
84
85
87
88
90

Export Amt.
10,104.454
12,054.878
12,212.840
12,619.773
75,401.198
43,617.936
33,709.501
34,691.439
18,816.624

Industry
Cereals
Mineral Fuel, Oil Etc; Bitumin Substitute; Mineral Wax
Organic Chemicals
Plastics and Articles thereof
Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery Etc; Parts thereof
Electric Machinery Etc.; Sound Equipment; TV Equipment
Vehicles, except Railway or Tramway, and Parts
Aircrat, Spacecraft, and Parts thereof
Optic, Photo Etc, Medic or Surgical Instruments

a. National Trade Data Bank two-digit harmonization code.
Source: US Department of Commerce, NationalTrade Data Bank, "Exports -Commodity byCountry"

Table 4: Principal Market - Ratio of Industries' Goods Exported to Japan and Latin America to
Industries' Goods Exported to the World, 1988-1991 averages (in percentages)
Industry
10 Cereals
27 Mineral Fuel, Oil Etc; Bitumin Substitute; Min. Wax
29 Organic Chemicals
39 Plastics and Articles thereof
84 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery Etc; Pts thereof
85 Electric Machinery Etc.; Sound Equipment; TV Equip
87 Vehicles, except Railway or Tramway, and Parts
88 Aircraft, Spacecraft, and Parts thereof
90 Optic, Photo Etc, Medic or Surgical Instruments

Japan
19.9
12.5
12.0
7.0
8.5
8.2
4.0
9.7
13.4

I Latin America'
7.8
123
9.2
8.6
6.9
5.0
3.5
4.8
5.0

a. Including the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago also.
indicate that it has
indicate that it ishasa 10%or higher share of US exports, while the lighter shaded areas
The darker shaded areas
at least above a7.5% share.
Source: US Department of Commerce, National Trade Data Bank, "Exports -Commodity by Country"

1996]

IDEAL FREE TRADE PARTNERS

Table 5: Top US Industries for Imports, 1991 (in S millions)
NTDB #
27
29
39
48
61-62
71
72-73
84
85
87
90

Import Amount
54,177.820
8,721.644
7,006.711
8,069.919
23,583.166
12,207.443
13,559.993
65,060.987
59,561.966
73,763.648
14,121.129

Industry
Mineral Fuel, Oil Etc; Bitumin Substitute; Mineral Wax
Organic Chemicals
Plastics and Articles thereof
Paper and Paper Board and Articles
Apparel Articles and Accessories, Etc
Nat Etc Pearls, Precious Stones Etc, Coin
Iron And Steel; Articles of Iron and Steel
Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery Etc; Parts thereof
Electric machinery Etc; Sound Equip; TV Equipment; Parts
Vehicles, except Railway and Tramway, and Parts Etc
Optic, Photo Etc, Medic or Surgical Instruments Etc

Source: US Department of Commerce, National Trade Data Bank, "Exports - Commodity by Country"

Table 6: Principal Supplier - Ratio of Industries' Goods Imported from Japan and Latin America
I
to industries' Goods Imported from the World, 1999-1991 averages (in percentages)
Industry
27 Mineral Fuel, Oil Etc; Bitumin Sub; Mineral Wax
29 Organic Chemicals
39 Plastics and Articles thereof
48 Paper and Paperboard and Articles
61-62 Apparel Articles and Accessories, Etc
71 Nat Etc Pearls, Precious Stones Etc, Coin
72-73 Iron and Steel; Articles of Iron and Steel
84 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery Etc; Pts thereof
85 Electric machinery Etc; Sound Equip; TV Equip; Parts
87 Vehicles, except Railway and Tramway, and Parts Etc
90 Optic, Photo Etc, Medic or Surgical Instnhments Etc

Japan
0.2
13.3
13.2
2.7
0.7
1.5
2o.6
29.8
33.2
40.0
40.0

Latin America'
18.5
7.1
2.3
0.8
13.0
7.5
7.1
1.4
1.0
0.9
1.4

a. Including the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago also.
shaded areas
indicate that it has
of US imports, while thelighter
The darker shaded areas
indicate that it ishasa 10%or higher share
at least above a7.5% share.
Source: US Department of Commerce, National Trade Data Bank, "Exports -Commodity byCountry"

I
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Table 7: Approximate Share of Total World Exports, 1988-1991

United States

1988
11.4

1989
12.1

1990
11.6

1991
12.4

Average
11.9

Japan
Latin America

9.4
2.6

9.2
2.7

8.5
2.6

9.3

9.1
2.6

....

Source: United Nations, InternationalTrade Statistics Yearbook 1991.

Table 8: Top US Exports to the World, 1988-1991 (averages in $ millions)
3 Digit SITCe
583
713
714
752
759
764
776
778
784
792

Export Amount
5,149.056
5,488.865
7,394.384
14,446.255
11,620.187
7,680.574
12,982.872
4,853.089
13,685.774
27,598.908

Commodity
Polymerization Products, Etc
Internal Combustion Piston Engines
Engines and Motors Nes
Automatic Data Processing Equipment
Office, ADP Machine Parts, Accessories
Telecommunications Equipment, Parts, Acc Nes
Transistors, Valves, Etc
Electrical Machinery Nes
Motor Vehicle Parts, Accessories Nes
Aircraft, Etc

a. Standard International Trade Classification, revision 2.
Source: United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1991.

Table 9: Approximate Share of World Exports for Top US Exports, 1988-1991 averages

Polymerization Products, Etc
Internal Combustion Piston Engines
Engines and Motors Nes
Automatic Data Processing Equip
Office, ADP Machine Pts, Ace
Telecom Etquip, Pts, Ace Nes
Transistors, Valves, Etc
Electrical Machinery Nes
Motor Vehicle Parts, Ace Nes
Aircraft, Etc

United States
11.0
16.0
36.3
21.5
24.7
13.8
20.9
13.4
17.6
46.6

Source: United Nations, InternationalTrade Statistics Yearbook 1991.

Japan
5.7
18.5
4.8
18.1
17.8
28.4
22.1
19.9
13.7
0.7

Latin America
2.0
2.9
0.3
2.8
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.6
1.1
1.0
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Table 10a: Similar Revealed Comparative Advantage Index for Tp US Exports, 1988-1991

Index
Polymerization Prods Etc
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Intml Combst Pisnt Engs
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Engines and Motors Nes
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Auto Data Proc Equip
United States
Japan
LatinAmerka
Office, ADP Mch Pts
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Telecom Eqp Pts Acc
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
franilstors, Valves tc
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Eletrical Machinery
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Motor Veh Pts Acc Nes
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
AircraftEtc
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica

I

0

0.92
0.63
0.77

12

1

3

1

I
*

_

1.34
2.03
1.12

I"

_

3.05
0.53
0.12

°

_

i
1.81
1.99
1.08

I

°
t_
t

_

2.08
1.96
0.08

I

_

1.16
3.12
0.12

I

_
I

*

1.76
2.43
0.08

*

1.13
2.19
0.23

*

I

I
1.48
i

__

_

1.51

I

0.42

"

_

I

_
3.92
0.08
0.38

_
*

_

Dots on theright side of thedashed
line indicate thecountry hasa revealed comparative advantage in that commodity.
The shaded
areasindicate that the countries have a very similar revealed comparative advantage andtherefore are competitive with
eachother in the particular good.
Source:
Tables 7,8, and9.
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Table 10b: Dissimilar Revealed Comparative Advantage Index for Top US Exports, 1988-1991

Index

0

Polymerization Prods Etc
0.92
United States
0.63
Japan
0.77
LatinAmerica
intrnl Combst Pisnt Engs _
1.34
United States
2.03
Japan
1.12
LatinAmerica
Engines and Motors Nes
3.05
United States
0.53
Japan
0.12
LatnAmerica
Auto Data Proc Equip
1.81
United States
1.99
Japan
___
1.08
LatinAmerica
_
Office, ADP Mch Pts
2.08
United States
1.96
Japan
*
0.08
Latin America
Telecom Eqp Pts Acc
1.16
United States
_
3.12
Japan
*
0.12
LatinAmerica
Transistors, Valves Etc
1.76
United States
_
2.43
Japan
0.08
*
LatinAmerica
Eletrical Machinery
1.13
United States
2.19
Japan
0.23 _
LatinAmerica
Motor Veh Pts Acc Nes
1.48
United States
1.51
Japan
0.42
Latin America
Aircraft Etc
3.92
United States
0.08
Japan
0.38
Latin America

I1

I

1

12

I

13

°
• I

I

i
I
I
_

I

I

I

•

Dots on theright side of thedashed line indicate thecountry hasa revealed comparative advantage in that commodity.
areasindicate that the countries have a very dissimilar revealed comparative advantage and therefore are not competitive
The shaded
with theUS in theparticular good.
Source: Tables 7,8, and9.
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Table I1: Top Latin American Export Commodities to the World, 1988-1991 (averages in S millions)
3 Digit SITC
011
057 & 058
071
081
222
281
287
333 & 334
682
684

Export Amount
1,519.599
4,261.736
4,686.215
4,241.072
1,807.624
2,785.945
1,916.236
17,405.342
3,664.606
2,143.896

Commodity
Meat, Fresh, Chilled, Frozen
Fruit, Nuts, Fresh, Dried, Preserved, Prepared
Coffee and Substitutes
Feeding Stuff for Animals
Seeds for Soft Fixed Oils
Iron Ore, Concentrates
Base Metal Ores, Concentrates Nes
Crude Petroleum & Petroleum Products, Refined
Copper Exc, Cement Copper
Aluminum

a. Standard International Trade Classification, revision 2.
Source: United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1991.

Table 12: Approximate Share of World Exports for Top Latin American Exports, 1988-1991
averages

Meat, Fresh, Chilled, Frozen
Fruit, Nuts, Fresh, Dried, Preserved, Prepared
Coffee and Substitutes
Feeding Stuff for Animals
Seeds for Soft Fixed Oils
Iron Ore, Concentrates
Base Metal Ores, Concentrates Nes
Crude Petroleum & Petroleum Products, Refined
Copper Exc, Cement Copper
Aluminum

United States
10.5
12.3
2.1
19.6
44.0
2.1
0.9
1.6
4.8
9.1

Source: United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1991.

Japan
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
5.3
0.0

Latin America
5.
16.0
47.6
26.3
18.1
34.1
1.3
6.6
16.8
7.2
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Table 13a: Similar Revealed Comparative Advantage Index for Top Latin American Exports, 19881991
Index
Meat
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Fruits, Nuts
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Coffee and Substitutes
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Animal Feeding Stuff
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Seeds for Soft Fixed Oils
United States

0

1

0.88
0.00
2.15

1

1.03
0.00
6.15

"

0.18
0.00
18.32

i
__
_

_
1.65
0.00
10.10

i

_

i
I

LatinAmerica

6.96

Iron Ore, Concentrates

•

__.._
_

United States

0.18

Japan

0.00

LatinAmerica

I

_

0.00

LatinAmerica
Crude, Refined Petrol
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
CopperExc
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Aluminum
United States
Japan

13

I

3.69

Japan

1

I

Japan

LatinAmerica
Base MetalOres
United States

12

*
i

13.12
0.01

0.00
OAS

I

0.14
0.03
2.53
0.40
0.58
6.45
0.76
0.00

I

2.76

Dots on the right side of the dashed line indicate the country has a revealed comparative advantage in that commodity.

The shadedareasindicate that the countries have a very similar revealed comparative advantage and therefore are competitive with
each other in the particular good.
Source: Tables 7, 11, and 12.
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I

ITable 3b: Dissimilar Revealed Comparative Advantage Index for Top Latin American Exports,
1

1988-1991
Index

Meat
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Fruits, Nuts
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Coffee and Substitutes
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Animal Feeding Stuff
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Seeds for Soft Fixed Oils
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Iron Ore, Concentrates
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Base Metal Ores
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Crude, Refined Petrol
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Copper Exc
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Aluminum
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica

I

0

I

I

2

I

13

I

_

0.88
0.00
2.15

1
___

_

1.03
0.00
6.15

_.
p
-"

_

0.18
0.00
18.32

*

_
i

_

1.65
0.00
10.10

I
t
__-3

_

3.69
0.00
6.96

__°
I
_

4..

_

0.18
0.00
13.12

I
I
i

*

0.01
0.00
0.48

I
I

0.14
0.03
2.53

°

_

1__

0.40
0.58
6.45
0.76
0.00
2.76

"
*

Dots on theright side of thedashed line indicate the country hasa revealed comparative advantage in that commodity.

The shadedareasindicate that the countries havea very dissimilar revealed comparative advantage andtherefore arenot competitive
with Latin America in theparticular good.
Source: Tables 7. I1, and 12.
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Table 14: Top Japanese Export Commodities to the World, 1988-1991 (averages in S millions)
3 Digit SITC
713
749
752
759
763
764
772
776
778
781

Commodity
Internal Combustion Piston Engines
Nonelectronic Machine Parts, Accessories Nes
Automatic Data Processing Equipment
Office, ADP Machine Parts, Accessories
Sound Recorders, Phonographs
Telecommunications Equipment, Parts, Accessories Nes
Switchgear Etc, Parts Nes
Transistors, Valves, Etc
Electrical Machinery Nes
Passenger Motor Vehicles Excluding Buses

Export Amount
6,334.063
5,025.745
12,059.497
8,467.736
7,027.027
15,686.899
5,475.522
13,664.405
7,189.040
40,884.013

a. Standard International Trade Classification, revision 2.
Source: United Nations. international Trade Statistics Yearbook 1991.

Table 15: Approximate Country Share of World Exports for Top Japanese Export Commodities,
1988-1991 averages

Internal Combustion Piston Engines
Nonelectronic Machine Parts, Accessories Nes
Automatic Data Processing Equipment
Office, ADP Machine Parts, Accessories
Sound Recorders, Phonographs
Telecommunications Equipment, Parts, Accessories
Switchgear Etc, Parts Nes
Transistors, Valves, Etc
Electrical Machinery Nes
Passenger Motor Vehicles Excluding Buses

United States
16.0
8.4
21.5
24.7
3.4
13.8
14.4
20.9
13.4
6.7

Source: United Nations, InternationalTradeStatistics Yearbook 1991.

Japan
18.5
14.8
18.1
17.8
44.3
28.4
16.4
22.1
19.9
26.1

Latin America
2.0
0.7
2.8
0.2
0.0
0.3
1.0
0.2
0.6
0.4

19961
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Table 16a: Similar Revealed Comparative Advantage Index for Top Japanese Exports, 1988-1991

Index
Intrnl Combst Pisni Engs
United States
1.34
Japan
2.03
1.12
LatinAmerica
Nonelec Mch Pts Acc
_
0.71
United States
1.62
Japan
0.27
LatinAmerica
_
Auto Data Proc Equip
1.81
United States
Japan
1.99
LatinAmerica
1.08
_
Office, ADP Mch Pis
2.08
United States
Japan
1.96
LatinAmerica
0.08
Sound Recorders, Phono
0.28
United States
4.87
Japan
LatinAmerica
0.01
_
Telecom Eqp Pts Acc
1.16
United States
Japan
3.12
0.12
LatinAmerica
__
SwitchgearEtc Pts Nes
1.21
United States
Japan
1.80
LatinAmerica
0.38
Transistors, Valves Etc
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Electrical Machinery
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Pass Motor Veh exc Bus
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica

1.76
2.43
0.08

0

1

1

12

1

13

1

•

t
*

i"

°

*

I
-

I

I
I

I
I

°

I

_

1.13
2.19
0.23
0.57
2.87
0.15

i
I

Dots on the right side of the dashedline indicate the country has a revealed comparative advantage in that commodity.
The shaded areasindicate that the countries have a very similar revealed comparative advantage and therefore are competitive with

eachother in the particular good.
Source: Tables 7, 14,and 15.
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Table 16b: Dissimilar Revealed Comparative Advantage Index for Top Japanese Exports, 1988-1991

Index

0

1

Intrnl Combst Pistn Engs __
United States
1.34
2.03
Japan
LatinAmerica
1.12
Nonelec Mch Pts Acc
_

United States
Japan
LatinAmeric
Auto Data Proc Equip
United States
Japan
LatinAmerica
Office, ADP Mch Pts
United States
Japan

LatinAi.er'a

I

1

I

12

13

1

I
I

0.71
1.62
0.27
1.81
1.99
1.08

I

2.08
1.96

I

0.08.

Sound Recorders, Phono

United States

0.2

Japan

4.87

LatinAmerica

0.01

Telecom Eqp Pts Acc
United States
Japan
LadnAmeri
Switchgear Etc Pts Nes
United States
Japan

LatinAmerica
Transistors, Valves Etc
United States
Japan

.
-)

_

1.16
3.12
0.12

°
.

1.21
_

0.38
1.76
2.43

LatiaAmerka

0.08

ElectricalMachinery
United States
Japan

1.13
2.19

LatinAmerica ,

0.23

Pass Motor Veh exc Bus

I
___

,

I

"

_

Unitd States

05

Japan
LatinAmerica

2.87
0.15

,

Dots on theright side of thedashed line indicate thecountry hasa revealed comparative advantage in that commodity.
The shaded
areasindicate that thecountries have a very dissimilar revealed comparative advantage andtherefore arenot competitive
with Japanin the particular good.
Source: Tables 7, 14,and15.
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Table 17: Gross Domestic Product, 1992 (in $ billions), Real GDP per Capita (SPPP), and Share of
World GDP, 1992 (in percentages)

United States

-

22,130

3.680
0.179
2.632
0.992
1.563
0.028
0.049
0.649
0.023
0.211
0.055
0.096
0.027
0.122
0.028
0.028
0.045
0.012
0.008

4,351
7,060
5,113
5,120
5,240
3,420
6,670
4,220
2,170
5,460
4,140
3,110
8,120
2,952
5,100
2,110
3,180
1,820
2,550

848.488
41.203
607.035
228.779
360.405
6.446
11.405
149.771
5.270
48.583
12.681
22.100
61.137
28.067
6.530
6.443
10.434
2.813
1.847

Latin America'
Chile
Mercosur
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Andean Group
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela
CACM
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua

World Share
100.000
25.672

per capita GDP

GDP
23,060.560
5,920.199

World

I

a. Including Panama, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, andTrinidad and Tobago also.
The shaded area represents the best performer (outside of the United States) on this characteristic.
Sources: The World Bank, World Development Report 1994, andFreedom House, Freedom Review, 26.1(1995).
Table 18: Price Stability -

Consumer Prices, 1990-1993 (percent change over previous year)

1990

1991

1992

3.3

1.7

171.7
440.9
28.3
102.0

24.9
1,008.7
15.1
68.5

...

____________

Stability
Score
0.1____
4.13

4 year
average

1993

1403

Latin America
Mercosur
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Andean Group

I

2,314.0
2,937.8
38.2
112.5
-

-

-

f!.b'1a.

1A

2l

12.1

8.5

14.8

Colombia

29.1

30.4

27.0

22.6

27.3

ncaragua

I

10iL

-

I

~

Z'

1

4

Ij

-

The shaded areasrepresent those countries which have an acceptable performance on this factor.
Source: International Monetary Fund. Internntlinal Ft ,,o... ¢rnt,,i,,rs Y-n'honk 1994

2.25
0.0
0.0
6.0
3.0
3.8

630.3
1634.0
25.0
84.3
-

10.6
2,148.4
18.3
54.1

1

1,--7

1

7.0
6.0
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Table 19: Real Effective Exchange Rates Stability, 1990-1992
Standard Deviation
4.6

Japan
Latin America
Chile
Mercosur
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Andean Group
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela
CA CM

Currency Stability Score
9.0
8.3
9.0
7.25
7.0
6.0
9.0
7.0
9.4
10.0
9.0
10.0
9.0
9.0
7.8

3.3
11.5
14.6
5.3
9.5
_

0.4
3.6
1.5
4.7
3.0

Costa Rica

3.6

9.0

El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua

3.8
15.9
2.5
12.1

9.0
5.0
10.0
6.0

Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994, and Hutbaucr and Schott 1994.

Table 20: Tax Revenue from International Trade and Transactions, 1986-1991 (percentages of

government revenue)

,Japan:

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Average

Score

1.34

1,35

1.40

1.32

L33

-

135

8.7

10M

10.06

IT
4.07
e6,0

76

147$

5.

Latin America--

Chile

9,87

9.70

10-21

11.60

-

-

-

-

-

Argentina

12.03

10-27

11.4

25.45

219

B~razil

2.2

1.64

3-38

2.29

1152

1.$8

2,17

100

Mereosur

Paraguay

IrUugully

..

Andean Group

Bliia

.

Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela_____
CACM
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras

Nicaragua..:

6,25

11.31

10.94

11.74

21.34

20.10

16.70

15.36

4.0

13.62

11.7

10.42

9,98

9-78

8.18

1G.16

6.0

-

-

-

-

-

-

4.8

[2Y55

15A

10.40

9.32

7.31

.5,95

10.16

6,0

19.24
21.97
20.76

19.39
18.44
14.39

17.79
15.50
18.32

16.10
14.34
10.89

12.20
14.00
9.72

17.26
17.31
15.94

4.0
4.0
4.0

23.41.

18.86
19.58
21.54
1158

12.54

7.50

5.60.

7,75

1.1.40

6.0

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

21.06
41.32
37.07
34.30

23.01
26.13
39.89
33.40

34.20
21.13
37.18
28.70

32.27
16.82
33.78
28.70

22.95
21.77
34.30
26.20

19.65
20.55
28.10

25.52
24.62
35.07
30.26'

1.2
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0

7.04 :710

16687

91.37

17.57

18.60

12-76

5.0

.

a. Simple average for 1986-1990.
The shaded areas
represent those countries which have an acceptable performance on this factor.
Sources: Non-Italicizcd data- International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1993.Italicized dataHufhauer and Schott 1994
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Table 21: Extent of Market Oriented Policies, 1994; Social Conditions, 1994
Market Policies Score
9,
6.0

J.apan
Latin America

78,6

1,
OW
5.6

71,9

710

Chile
M.ersier

10,0
7.8

Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Andean Group

65.8
67.2
72.4

Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru

6.0
6.0
6.0
6.8
80
8.0
6.0
4.0

Venezuela

9.0

70,17,

3.6
6.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
2.0

76.0
65.2
64.0
65.2
65.4

CACM
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua

Social Conditions Score

Life Expectancy

6.0

_________

5.0
5.0
7T0
5.0
3.0
6.0
5.0
4.0

60.5
60.0
66.2
63.6

5.6
9.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
5.0

a9.0 due to the extent of Japan's over-regulation
a.This study derived this number from Bergsten andNorman 1993b. It gave Japan
of theeconomy.
represent those countries which have anacceptable performance on this factor.
The shaded areas
Source: Taken from Hufbauer andSchott 1994, 102.
Table 22: Political Conditions, 1994
Political
Rights
Japan

&_____

Latin Amedca_________
Chile
MercuSur
Argentina

8A6

free

Overall
Rating

re1.

--

.15.7
&6

5T,7

partly ftec

7.1
&6

partly free
free

-

-

8.6

.1
5.7
7.1
5.7T
7.1

7.______

&.64.
4.3
7.1

CACM

-

Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala

T

10.0
7.1
5.7
7.1
5.7

free

7.1

8.6

Paraguay
Uruguayt
Andean Group
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
VemeMa

Nicaragua

Freedom
Rating
___

8.6

Brazil

Honduoras

Civil
Liberties
&6

4.3

6.4
8.6

-6.86

*

~

7.9

partly free
ftee
partly free
Party fee4.

6.4
7.9
5.0
7.1
6.98

free
patyfreel

pantyfree

.7.1

711

ffee

-

9.6
7.1
4.3

~

79
816
75
7.9

partly free

Scale. 10 very free to Onus free.
The shaded areasrepresent those countries which havean acceptable performance on this factor.
.1. up or down indicates a significant change in Political Rights or Civil Liberties since the last survey.
It up or down indicate a general trend in freedom.
Source: Freedom House. Freedon, Review, January-February 1Q05.

9.3
7.1
5.0
7.1
6.4

........
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nTable 23: Performance Scores on Readiness Factors
a! Table 23: Performance Scores on Readiness Factors

Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua

6.0
7.0
0.0

1

50
10.0
6.0

1

20
4.0
2.0

0.0
0.0
5.0

4.0
5.0
5.0

5.0
7.1
6.4

3.67
5.52
4.07

represent those countries which have an acceptable overall performance (above a6.5) on the readiness factors.
The shaded areas
Source: Tables 18-22,

